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Sitting on Our Hands: Comparing Canada’s Intervention Policy in Libya and Syria 
I. Résumé/Abstract  
Dans le sillage du Printemps Arabe, le Canada a réagi différemment aux crises en Libye et en 
Syria. En Libye, il participe à une coalition de l’OTAN qui contribue à renverser le régime de 
Gaddafi. En Syrie, il adopte une politique d’endiguement. Mon mémoire analyse les raisons qui 
ont motivé les différentes politiques d’intervention du Canada en Libye et en Syrie en 2011. 
J’affirme que le Canada a participé à l’intervention militaire en Libye parce que ses intérêts 
nationaux étaient menacés par le conflit, qu’il n’était pas le sujet de pressions domestiques contre 
l’intervention, et qu’il ressentait une responsabilité envers l’OTAN. Je soutiens aussi que d’autres 
facteurs – soit l’isolation géographique et politique de la Libye, la faiblesse de ses forces 
militaires, et la confiance de l’Occident envers l’opposition libérale qui s’est rapidement 
organisée – ont facilité la décision d’intervenir parce que le Canada jugeait que l’intervention 
comportait peu de risques. En revanche, je maintiens que le Canada n’avait ni opportunité ni 
incitatif pour intervenir en Syrie. Dû en partie à la complexité de la crise, une impasse à l’OTAN 
et au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU a empêché la création d’une coalition multilatérale. Je 
soutiens que, même si le Canada avait eu l’opportunité d’intervenir, il aurait été improbable qu’il 
l’ait fait, parce qu’il n’avait aucun intérêt économique en Syrie, et que le gouvernement Canadien 
n’a pas ressenti de pressions domestiques en faveur d’une intervention. Je conclus en proposant 
des pistes de recherche liée aux contraintes sous lesquelles les puissances moyennes opèrent dans 
le système international.  
 
In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, Canada responded differently to the crises in Libya 
and Syria. In Libya, Canada participated in a NATO-led coalition which eventually helped topple 
the Gaddafi regime. In Syria, Canada “sat on its hands” and adopted a policy of containment. My 
thesis addresses the reasons behind Canada’s different intervention policies in Libya and in Syria 
in 2011. I argue that Canada participated in a military intervention in Libya because its national 
interests were threatened by the conflict, it experienced no domestic pressure against the 
intervention, and it felt a responsibility towards NATO to intervene. I also argue that other factors 
– Libya’s political and geographic isolation, the weakness of its military, and the West’s trust in 
the liberal opposition which organized quickly –  may have facilitated Canada’s decision to 
intervene because it judged the intervention in Libya to be low-risk. In contrast, I argue that 
Canada did not intervene in Syria because it lacked an opportunity and an incentive to do so. 
Paralysis at the UN Security Council and NATO hindered the creation of a multilateral military 
intervention in Syria, due to concerns about the complexity of the crisis. Provided with the 
opportunity to intervene however, it is unlikely that Canada would have done so because it had no 
economic interests in Syria, nor did it experience domestic pressure to intervene. I conclude by 
suggesting further avenues of research regarding the constraints experienced by middle powers in 
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In early 2011, protests broke out throughout the Arab world. Though there were regional 
differences in the way the conflicts evolved, their genesis was caused by the same grievances; 
corrupt regimes, nepotism, and injustice.1 Citizens demanded respect for their human rights 
and for a democratic political system.2 While some countries, such as Djibouti3 and Saudi 
Arabia4, experienced minor protests that were quickly quashed, other countries, such as 
Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, experienced important protests which evolved into civil 
conflicts.5  
                                                 
1 Brynen, Rex, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joëlle Zahar. Beyond the Arab Spring: 
Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2012: vii.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Protests in Djibouti began and ended in February 2011. The stated goal was to remove the President, Ismail 
Omar Guelleh, from office. By the end of February, mass arrests had quelled protests. “Afrol News - Djibouti 
Protesters Keep up the Pressure,” Afrol News,  19 February 2011, http://www.afrol.com/articles/37368; “Afrol 
News - Mass Arrests Stopped Further Djibouti Protests,” Afrol News, 27 February 2011, 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/37449; “Djibouti Police Clash with Anti-Regime Protesters,” France 24, February 
19, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110219-police-clash-with-anti-government-protesters-djibouti; 
“Protesters Rally against Government in Djibouti,” CNN, February 18, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/18/djibouti.protest/index.html; “Djiboutians Rally to Oust 
President - Al Jazeera English,” Al Jazeera, 18 February 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121816513686216.html.  
4 In Saudi Arabia, the protest did not even materialize due to a show of force by Saudi Arabia’s government. 
Protestors had planned a demonstration through Facebook, which never occurred. Compiled by Ian Saleh, “Saudi 
Arabia ‘Day of Rage’ Begins Quietly, Markets Watch Protests Closely,” Washington Post, 11 March 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031103685.html; “Activists: 
Hundreds Protest in Hofuf, Qatif on Saudi ‘Day of Rage,’” CNN, 3 March 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/11/saudi.arabia.protests/index.html; “Massive Show of Force 
Quashes Saudi Arabia Protests,” Associated Press, 11 March 2011, 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/11/police-flood-saudi-capital-ahead-planned-protests.html; “Saudi 
Arabia Prepares for ‘Day of Rage’ Protests,” BBC News, 10 March 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-
middle-east-12708487/saudi-arabia-prepares-for-day-of-rage-protests; “Saudi Police Thwart Capital City 
Protests.” CBS News, 11 March 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-police-thwart-capital-city-protests/.  
5 Heydarian, Richard Javad. How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious 
Future of the Middle East Uprisings. New edition. London: Zed Books, 2014; Khosrokhavar, Farhad. New Arab 
Revolutions That Shook the World. 1 edition. Boulder, CO: Routledge, 2012; Adonis, Philippe Sergeant, and Ali 
Ibrahim. Printemps arabes - Religion et Révolution. Paris: La Différence, 2014; Gelvin, James L. The Arab 
Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012; Lynch, Marc. The Arab 
Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.  
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Despite being faced with conflicts which seemed similar, Canada’s reaction varied from 
one case to another. Two countries emerge as worthy of comparison due to their apparent 
similarities and to the difference in Canada’s reaction: Libya and Syria. In Libya, Canada 
responded quickly to the crisis and held an active role in the NATO coalition which helped 
topple the Gaddafi regime in 2011.6  In Syria, however, Canada’s government “sat on its 
hands” and refused to intervene; in 2011, Ottawa’s policy was to avoid deep engagement and 
commitment.7  
I seek to understand why Canada intervened in Libya, and refrained from intervening in 
Syria in the wake of the civil conflicts. Understanding the conditions under which Canada will 
conduct a military intervention is important because it informs us about the foreign policy 
priorities of the Canadian government and the constraints under which it operates as a middle 
power in the international system. Moreover, the case studies chosen are particularly 
informative for the study of military intervention, because two conflicts warranted very 
different reactions from the Canadian government, despite their seemingly similar dynamics 
and the fact that they occurred simultaneously.  
In order to answer my research question, I use a neoclassical realist approach to foreign 
policy. Adapted to Canadian foreign policy, this approach will allow me to study both internal 
                                                 
6 “NATO and Libya,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed January 22nd, 2016. URL: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm?selectedLocale=en; Constanza Musu, “Canada and the 
MENA region: The Foreign Policy of a Middle Power,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18 (2012): 72.   
7 Thomas Juneau, “The Civil War in Syria and Canada’s Containment Policy,” International Journal 70 (2015): 
474 and 482.  
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and external factors which contribute to a state’s decision to conduct a military intervention in 
a foreign state.  
Though I use Canada’s involvement in Libya and Syria as case studies, I expect the 
findings of the research to provide insights applicable to the decisions of middle powers to 
conduct military interventions. 
IV. Literature Review 
Military interventions in foreign states are risky ventures. The decision by a state to 
intervene militarily in a foreign state is an important one, as state leaders must mobilize both 
sufficient resources and society’s support for the mission. And while all states operate under 
domestic constraints, in comparison to major powers, middle powers are especially 
constrained by their limited military resources and relative power in the international system.8 
Thus military intervention is an especially important decision for a middle power. The 
following is an overview of theories of military intervention that purport to explain why, how, 
and when military interventions occur.  
                                                 
8 Stephen, Matthew. “The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing No Longer 
Overlooked: Assessing the Existence and Role of Middle Power States.” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations 14 (2013); Cooper, David A. “Somewhere Between Great and Small: Disentangling the 
Conceptual Jumble of Middle, Regional, and ‘Niche’ Powers.” The Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations, Summer 2013, 25; Holmes, John W. “Middle Power.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed August 
17, 2017. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power/; “A Critical Review of the Concept 




1. Why Interventions Occur 
Regarding why interventions occur, offensive and defensive realist theories argue that 
systemic pressures cause states to intervene militarily, while the theory of humanitarian 
intervention argues that some states feel compelled to intervene to protect human security 
abroad. Diversionary War Theory argues that states will conduct military interventions in an 
effort to distract the public from domestic issues, whereas Prospect Theory posits that 
decisions regarding military intervention (and foreign policy more generally) are subject to 
the individual leader’s assessment of risk. 
i. Offensive and Defensive Realism 
Offensive realism claims that states in the international system are perpetually revisionist. 
They are in constant competition to become hegemonic powers because there is no other way 
to guarantee their survival in a self-help system. Therefore, they are likely to go on the 
offensive regardless of their share of relative power or whether they feel directly threatened.9 
In order to guarantee their survival in an anarchical international environment, states may 
therefore conduct military interventions preemptively.  
                                                 
9 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated ed. edition. New York: WW Norton, 
2014; Labs, Eric J. “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims.” Security Studies 6, 
no. 4 (June 1, 1997): 1–49. For examples of offensive realism, see: Layne, Christopher. “The ‘Poster Child for 
Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon.” Security Studies 12, no. 2 (December 1, 2002): 120–64; 
Mearsheimer, John J. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” International Security 15, 
no. 1 (1990): 5–56; Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International 
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter, 1995/1994): 5–49; Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of 
America’s World Role. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999; Schweller, Randall L. “Bandwagoning 
for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107.  
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Defensive realist theory claims that states will only use their military power to intervene 
in other states occur under certain conditions. Examples of these conditions are an increased 
level of threat in the international environment;10 sudden changes in relative power; 
opportunities to exploit resources in a foreign state; a state developing offensive weapons; and 
multipolarity.11  
An illustrative example of the applicability of offensive and defensive realist theories is 
captured by the behavior of Germany, France, and the UK in 1936. As per offensive realist 
theory, Germany displayed behavior typical of a revisionist power by remilitarizing the 
Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. French and UK intelligence were 
aware of Germany’s expansionist desires.12 Defensive realist theory would suggest that 
France and the UK would have responded to this aggressive intention, but Germany met no 
resistance from France or the UK until 1939, when it invaded Poland.13 Multiple authors have 
                                                 
10 Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the 
Periphery.” Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (2004): 179. 
11 Ibid. For more in the defensive realist literature, see: Christensen, Thomas J. Useful Adversaries. Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996; Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. “Chain Gangs and Passed 
Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–68; 
Glaser, Charles L. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 
50–90; Glaser, Charles L. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security 19, no. 3 
(1994): 50–90; Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann. “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We 
Measure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82; Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security 
Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214; Jervis, Robert. System Effects. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998; Jervis, Robert. “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.” 
International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 42–63; Evera, Stephen Van. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.” 
International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 5–43; Evera, Stephen Van. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of 
Conflict. 1 edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.  
12 The Rhineland had been demilitarized following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. See Shore, Zach. “Hitler, 
Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine.” Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (January 1, 
1999): 5–18; Neville, Peter. “A Prophet Scorned? Ralph Wigram, the Foreign Office and the German Threat, 
1933-36.” Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 41–54; Creswell, Michael, and Marc 
Trachtenberg. “France and the German Question, 1945-1955.” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 3 (August 1, 
2003): 5–28. 
13 Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine”, 5.  
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tried to explain why France and the UK did not act as defensive realism would expect. They 
argue that France and the UK underestimated Germany’s expansive desires; had they 
correctly assessed Germany’s intentions, they would have acted sooner, possibly preventing 
Germany’s invasion of Poland.14 
ii. Humanitarian Intervention 
 A normative explanation of military intervention posits that this decision is compelled 
by threats to human security.15 According to this theory, some states will use military 
intervention to protect the citizens of other countries when their governments either will not 
                                                 
14 Germany went on to invade Poland in 1939, at which point France and the UK declared war on Germany. For 
a summary of key events in WWII, see: Wells, Anne Sharp. Historical Dictionary of World War II. 1st Edition 
edition. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 1999. For scholars who claim that a pre-emptive threat may have 
deterred Germany, see: Shore, Zach. “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 5–18; Neville, Peter. “A Prophet Scorned? Ralph Wigram, 
the Foreign Office and the German Threat, 1933-36.” Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 1 (January 1, 
2005): 47. Ripsman and Levy have argued that France predicted that Germany was rising quickly, but were 
waiting for British support, which never occurred. They argue that Britain believed that “German ascendancy 
was only temporary” and that it could eventually neutralize the threat; Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. 
“The Preventive War That Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s.” Security 
Studies 16, no. 1 (March 2007): 32–67.  
15 These theories belong to the constructivist school of thought, which challenges the realist conception of what 
matters in military intervention. Constructivists argue that those material forces – which realists claim provide 
structure and hierarchy in the international environment – are only as important as we make them. In other 
words, it is ideas that shape the direction of the interaction between states; a revisionist state will create a self-
help system, whereas a Lockean state will create Lockean liberal structures. States are independent agents, 
structures are created by ideas, and these structures put pressure on the agents to act a certain way. Over decades 
of interactions between states, norms and rules are created and perpetuated. This “path dependent” approach to 
foreign policy decisions expects states to make foreign policy decisions in response to incentives (as predicted 
by the rationalist model) but that these decisions are also influenced by internalized norms and rules in 
international relations that guide states’ actions. The constructivist school of thought thus suggests that the 
motives behind a military intervention are guided by a state’s internalization of norms and ideas. See: Holzgrefe, 
J. L., and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. 1 edition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society. 
1st edition. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996; Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International 
Politics. 1st edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Bull, Hedley, Andrew Hurrell, and 
Stanley Hoffman. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th edition. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2012; Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. 1 edition. 
Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
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or cannot protect them.16 Humanitarian intervention is an expression of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P), a norm of international law whereby the international community is 
responsible for preventing “war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and 
genocide within a state’s borders.”17 The March 1999 NATO intervention against Serb forces 
in Kosovo is often cited as an example of humanitarian intervention.18 However, there is no 
consensus regarding the extent to which the R2P norm actually matters when a state evaluates 
whether or not it will conduct a military intervention. While constructivist scholars argue that 
R2P necessarily factors into a state’s assessment of whether it should intervene in a foreign 
state,19 most realist scholars argue that R2P has no decisive impact on a state’s decision to 
intervene militarily.20 
                                                 
16 Hopf, Ted. “Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identities and Military 
Intervention in Abkhazia.” Review of International Studies 31, no. S1 (December 2005): 225–43.; Bellamy, Alex 
J. “Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society.” Review of International 
Studies 29, no. 3 (July 2003): 321–40; Walling, Carrie Booth. “Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and 
Humanitarian Intervention.” Human Rights Quarterly 37, no. 2 (May 13, 2015): 383–413; Orend, Brian. “Just 
Wars and Cosmopolitan Hope.” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, no. 104 (2004): 128–49; 
Bentley, Michelle. “The Intervention Taboo(s): Strategy and Normative Invalidation.” Review of International 
Studies 43, no. 3 (July 2017): 557–80; Butler, Michael J. “Just Causes or False Premises?  Just War Theory and 
Western Military Intervention, 1945--1995.” Doctoral Dissertations, January 1, 2004, 1–370; Clark, John F. “A 
Constructivist Account of the Congo Wars.” African Security 4, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 147–70.  
17 Basaran, Halil Rahman. “Identifying the Responsibility to Protect.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 38 
(2014): 195.  
18 NATO stated its objectives were two-fold, namely to (1) “help achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis, (2) 
“promote stability and security in neighboring countries”; see “NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview.” 
Accessed August 10, 2017. http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. For the ICISS report, see: International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). “The Responsibility to Protect.” International 
Development Research Centre, 2001. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. Some scholars also 
agreed that the intervention in Kosovo was acceptable on humanitarian grounds. See Gholiagha, Sassan. “‘To 
Prevent Future Kosovos and Future Rwandas.’ A Critical Constructivist View of the Responsibility to Protect.” 
The International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 8 (November 17, 2015): 1074–97.  
19 Glanville, Luke. “Does R2P Matter? Interpreting the Impact of a Norm.” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 2 
(June 1, 2016): 184–99; Bellamy, Alex J. “The Responsibility to Protect: Added Value or Hot Air?” Cooperation 
and Conflict 48, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 333–57; Widmaier, Wesley W., and Luke Glanville. “The Benefits 
of Norm Ambiguity: Constructing the Responsibility to Protect across Rwanda, Iraq and Libya.” Contemporary 
Politics 21, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 367–83.  
20 Murray, Robert W. “Humanitarianism, Responsibility or Rationality? Evaluating Intervention as State 
Strategy.” In Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, 15–33. Palgrave 
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It is also important to note that military interventions are subject to less scrutiny when 
they are sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.21 For middle powers, approval by 
a multilateral organization is necessary because they generally do not have the military power 
to intervene alone. However, even major powers with the power to intervene alone will seek 
approval; for instance, the United States will often seek approval by the United Nations 
Security Council before conducting a military intervention.22 Although strong states can often 
intervene in a foreign state without the approval of a multilateral organization, they risk facing 
significant criticism for doing so. For instance, the US continues to be criticized for its 
decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003 without UN approval.23 
iii. War as a Diversion 
The most prominent theory at the domestic level of analysis which purports to explain 
military intervention is the Diversionary Theory of War (DTW). DTW argues that, in an 
                                                 
Macmillan, London, 2013; Hehir, Aidan. “The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and 
the Responsibility to Protect.” International Security 38, no. 1 (July 1, 2013): 137–59; Morris, Justin. “Libya and 
Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum.” International Affairs 89, no. 5 (September 1, 2013): 
1265–83; “Revisiting ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after Libya and Syria.” E-International Relations. Accessed 
July 29, 2017. http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/08/revisiting-responsibility-to-protect-after-libya-and-syria/; 
Reinold, Theresa. “The Responsibility to Protect – Much Ado about Nothing?” Review of International Studies 
36, no. S1 (October 2010): 55–78; Rieff, David. “Saints Go Marching In.” The National Interest, no. 114 (2011): 
6–15. 
21 Recchia, Stefano. “Authorising Humanitarian Intervention: A Five-Point Defence of Existing Multilateral 
Procedures.” Review of International Studies 43, no. 1 (January 2017): 50–72; Yoo, John C. “Force Rules: UN 
Reform and Intervention Symposium: UN Reform.” Chicago Journal of International Law 6 (2006 2005): 641–
62; Macklem, Patrick. “Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International Law.” 
Ethics &amp; International Affairs 22, no. 4 (January 2008): 369–93.  
22 Recchia, Stefano. “Why Seek International Organisation Approval under Unipolarity? Averting Issue Linkage 
vs. Appeasing Congress.” International Relations 30, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 78–101;  
23 Kofi Annan, previous Secretary-General to the United Nations, publicly declared that the US intervention in 
Iraq was illegal and a breach of international law. See MacAskill, Ewen, and Julian Borger. See “Iraq War Was 
Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan.” The Guardian, September 16, 2004, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq; Roberts, Adams. “The Law and the Use of Force after 
Iraq.” Survival 45, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 31–56; Heinze, Eric A. “Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: 
Norms, Discourse, and State Practice.” Parameters 36, no. 1 (2006): 20–34.  
15 
 
effort to create a distraction, leaders will start wars when faced with domestic political or 
economic issues.24 Adventurous foreign policies will be especially commonplace when the 
leader faces the possibility of re-election, and when foreign policy decisions made by the 
leader can impact their possible re-election.25 The driver behind adopting an aggressive or 
interventionist foreign policy is to both distract the electorate from issues at home, but also to 
create a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, whereby support for the leader is bolstered.26 An 
example of Diversionary Theory is Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. 
Argentinian president Leopoldo Galtieri sought to re-establish support for his government 
after a period of sharp economic decline which pitted him against an opposition composed of 
union representatives, students, business leaders, the Church, intellectuals, and human rights 
activists.27 Galtieri thus decided to invade the Falkland Islands in an effort to recapture the 
contested territory from the British and divert public opinion away from the trouble at home.28  
                                                 
24 Bugra Kanat, Kilic. “Leadership Style and Diversionary Theory of Foreign Policy: The Use of Diversionary 
Strategies by Middle Eastern Leaders During and in the Immediate Aftermath of the Gulf War.” Dissertation, 
Syracuse University, 2011. http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=psc_etd; Tir, 
Jaroslav, and Michael Jasinski. “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic Minorities.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 5 (October 1, 2008): 641–64; Tir, Jaroslav. “Territorial Diversion: 
Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict.” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 413–25; 
Blomdahl, Mikael. “Diversionary Theory of War and the Case Study Design: President Clinton’s Strikes on Iraq 
and Yugoslavia.” Armed Forces & Society 43, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 545–65; Gent, Stephen E. “Scapegoating 
Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War.” International Interactions 
35, no. 1 (March 17, 2009): 1–29; Mayer, Arno J. “Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956: 
A Research Assignment.” The Journal of Modern History 41, no. 3 (1969): 292–303; Smith, Alastair. 
“Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems.” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 133–53; 
Levy, Jack S. “Domestic Politics and War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 653–
73; Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. “The Dividends of Diversion: Mature Democracies’ Proclivity 
to Use Diversionary Force and the Rewards They Reap from It.” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 
(2009): 483–515.  
25 Alastair, “Diversionary Foreign Policy,” 150. 
26 Tir and Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War,” 645.  
27 Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” 449.  
28 Ibid, 443.  
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iv. Prospect Theory 
An important individual level-theory29 is Prospect Theory. In the larger context of 
foreign policy-making, this theory posits that decisions are based on judgements made about 
the state of the world and that these judgements are distorted under conditions of risk.30 In 
other words, leaders who are risk-averse are more likely to base their decisions on potential 
costs rather than gains. A good illustration is provided by McDermott’s study of the reactions 
of President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
                                                 
29 The individual level of analysis holds that foreign policy decisions are not entirely rational calculations, 
because the leaders who make foreign policy decisions are fallible human beings. Foreign policy decisions made 
by leaders can be affected by the leader’s cognitive processes, which encompass emotions, psychology, beliefs, 
and personality. Foreign policy decisions can be affected by simple factors such as fatigue during a crisis, or a 
decision-maker’s personal experience with a particular state or society; these factors can create biases. Although 
these biases are most often subconscious, they will affect a decision-maker’s ability to make an entirely objective 
and rational calculation. Regarding military intervention, the individual level of analysis argues that due to 
certain cognitive biases, the exact same situation can be evaluated quite differently by individual decision-
makers, and this is why there is often disagreement about the course of action to take when facing a crisis. This 
is a micro-level theory which focuses on individual decision-makers and how their cognitive biases and risk 
aversion will impact the decision to conduct a military intervention. For works regarding leader behavior and 
foreign policy, see: Hermann, Margaret G. “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal 
Characteristics of Political Leaders.” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 7–46; Axelrod, Robert, 
ed. Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2015; Rivera, Joseph De. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. 1St Edition edition. Columbus, Ohio: 
C. E. Merrill, 1965; Holsti, Ole R. “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy.” Journal of International 
Affairs 21, no. 1 (1967): 16–39; Bonham, G. Matthew, Michael J. Shapiro, and George J. Nozicka. “A Cognitive 
Process Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” Simulation & Games 7, no. 2. Accessed April 21, 2017; 
Bonham, G. Matthew. “Cognitive Mapping as a Technique for Supporting International Negotiation.” Theory 
and Decision 34, no. 3 (May 1, 1993): 255–73; McDermott, Rose. Risk-Taking in International Politics: 
Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001; Kahneman, 
Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47, no. 2 
(1979): 263–91.  
30 McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, 15. For a description of Prospect Theory and its merits 
versus Expected Utility Theory, see Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–91; For a description of Prospect Theory and its 
direct application to a crisis, see McDermott, Rose, and Jacek Kugler. “Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect 
Theory Analyses: The US Decision to Launch Operation ‘desert Storm’, January 1991.” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 24, no. 3 (September 1, 2001): 49–85; For a controlled experiment with “framing” in Prospect Theory, 
see Boettcher, William A. “Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced 
Risk Behavior.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (2004): 331–55; For an analysis regarding how 
“framing” impacts public support for a military intervention, see Nincic, Miroslav. “Loss Aversion and the 
Domestic Context of Military Intervention.” Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 1 (1997): 97–120.  
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Brzezinski during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980.31 Carter was hesitant to intervene 
military because of his declining popularity, the failure of attempts at diplomatic resolution, 
and pressure emanating from Congress and the American public.32 Vance assessed that 
inaction would eventually lead to a peaceful resolution and felt that intervention would lead to 
potential loss of American lives, which he deemed unacceptable.33 Brzezinski, for his part, 
believed inaction would worsen the situation and damage the prestige of the United States.34   
2. How and When Interventions Occur 
Theorists have also given thought to the constraints that shape how interventions occur. 
Of note are geopolitical theories which claim that a foreign state’s geography can impact the 
strategy a state will adopt when intervening, though the advent of modern war technology has 
alleviated these constraints. Finally, theorists also address the role of public opinion which 
can stall a military intervention as the elite must convince the public of the intervention’s 
raison d’être or, alternatively, exert pressure on elites to intervene, particularly in the case of 
humanitarian intervention in foreign states.  
i. Geography and Military Intervention  
Though geography used to play an important role in military intervention by making 
the intervention costly, the advent of modern war technology has alleviated this constraint. 
                                                 
31 In 1980, 53 Americans were held hostage in Iran for over six months.  This occurred in the context of the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979; militant Iranian students took hold of the US embassy and captured 53 Americans. 
See McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, 45. 
32 Ibid, 47.  
33 Ibid, 60.  
34 In the end, Brzezinski’s opinion swayed Carter and the US went ahead with the rescue mission, which failed 
and caused the death of eight American soldiers. Ibid, 63 and 74.  
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Previously, some state-level factors, such as topography and climate, could make military 
intervention both costly and ineffective, impacting a state’s decision on how best to conduct 
an effective intervention.35 Indeed, a country’s military capability was greatly constrained by 
the ease of access to the state (whether it is landlocked or coastal);36 by the area of the state 
(whether it is large or small)37; and by its topography (whether it is flat or mountainous). A 
cautionary tale regarding climate is that of the Russian Winter, in reference to extreme 
weather conditions in Russia which caused operations by the Swedish, French, and Germans 
to fail in 1707, 1812, and 1941, respectively.38  
With the increasing reliance on the use of airstrikes both by manned and unmanned 
aerial vehicles however,39 geographical constraints on intervention have decreased. For 
instance, some suggest that the success of air-power technology used in Afghanistan 
demonstrated the emergence of a new model of warfare based on precision weapons 
                                                 
35 Bulatov, Col O. G., Lt Col Yu V. Klemin, and Lt Col V. G. Stradin. “Effectiveness of Geophysical Conditions 
on Military Operations.” Military Thought 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 123–29.  
36 Woolley, Peter J. “Geography and the Limits of US Military Intervention.” Conflict Quarterly, Fall 1991, 35–
50; Hansen, David G. “The Immutable Importance of Geography.” Parameters, Spring 1997, 55–64; Evans, 
Michael. “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War.” Naval War College Review 56, 
no. 1 (Summer 2003): 132–50.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Chew, Allen F. “Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies.” Leavenworth Papers. Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, December 1981. 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/chew.pdf.  
39 Boyle, Michael J. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 1, 
2013): 1–29; Boyle, Michael J. “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy. Edited by Peter L. 
Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg; Drone Theory. By Grégoire Chamayou.” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 
1, 2016): 210–11; Hornick, Charles, Daniel Burkhart, and David Shunk. “Adapting to Strategic Change: 
Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times.” Parameters 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2016): 41–50; McPeak, Merrill A., and 
Robert A. Pape. “Hit or Miss.” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2004. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2004-09-01/hit-or-miss; Hartle, Anthony E. “Atrocities in War: Dirty 
Hands and Noncombatants.” Social Research 69, no. 4 (2002): 963–79; Pape, Robert A. “The True Worth of Air 
Power.” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004): 116–30.  
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destroying enemies at a distance and that this model would eventually eradicate the need to 
have soldiers on the ground.40  
ii. Public Opinion  
Finally, theorists also consider the constraint that public opinion can place on military 
interventions; public opinion can either facilitate or complicate as well as impact the timing of 
a military intervention, especially in democratic states.41 
Some theorists argue that public opinion can constrain the use of force because in 
democracies, leaders are accountable to their electorate; a failed policy can impact the 
                                                 
40Stephen D. Biddle provides an overview of those arguments in favor of the “Afghan model” of warfare. See: 
Biddle, Stephen D. “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq.” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (2005): 161–76. The “Afghan Model” of warfare has been expanded on by the 
following authors: Gordon, Michael R. “A NATION CHALLENGED: MILITARY STRATEGY; Gains and 
Limits in New Low-Risk War.” The New York Times, December 29, 2001, sec. World. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/29/world/a-nation-challenged-military-strategy-gains-and-limits-in-new-low-
risk-war.html; HENDREN, JOHN. “Afghanistan Yields Lessons for Pentagon’s Next Targets.” Los Angeles 
Times, January 21, 2002. http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/21/news/mn-24009; Moniz, Dave. “Afghanistan’s 
Lessons Shaping New Military.” USA Today, October 8, 2002. 
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-10-07-afghan-lessons_x.htm; Scarborough, Rowan. 
“Pentagon Uses Afghan War as Model for Iraq.” Washington Times, December 4, 2001; Zakaria, Fareed. “Face 
the Facts: Bombing Works.” Newsweek, December 3, 2001; “A New Doctrine for New Wars.” Wall Street 
Journal, November 30, 2001; Kelly, Michael. “The Air-Power Revolution.” Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 4 (April 
2002).  
41 Generally, Democratic Peace Theory claims that it is difficult for states to conduct military interventions; 
democracies face a challenge that authoritarian states do not, namely that they need to secure domestic approval 
for the use of force. See: Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 205–35; Tocqueville, Alexis De. Democracy in America. New York: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2006; Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. Causes of War. Chichester, West Sussex, 
U.K.; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010; Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. Triangulating Peace: 
Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. 
For a discussion on what factors shape public opinion, see: Goldsmith, Benjamin E., Yusaku Horiuchi, and 
Takashi Inoguchi. “American Foreign Policy and Global Opinion: Who Supported the War in Afghanistan?” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005): 408–29. For a discussion regarding how public opinion 
contributes to DPT, see: Tomz, Michael R., and Jessica L. P. Weeks. “Public Opinion and the Democratic 
Peace.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849–65. 
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leader’s credibility and even impact their chances at re-election.42 This will not necessarily 
impact the decision to conduct a military intervention, but it may impact its timing. Leaders 
may therefore introduce policy regarding the use of force at times when public attentiveness is 
not focused on the crisis. For instance, concerns over public opinion shaped the Bush and 
Clinton administration’s response to the crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s.43 Indeed, 
Matthew A. Baum argues that Bush introduced ground troops in Somalia and that Clinton 
decided to de-escalate the crisis at times when public attentiveness to the crisis in Somalia 
was low.44   
On the flip side, public opinion can pressure decision-makers in favor of 
intervention.45 For instance, vocal diasporas contributed greatly to bringing publicity to the 
                                                 
42 Domestic audience costs theory argues that public opinion acts as a constraint on the use of force; leaders 
suffer domestic political costs if they threaten an enemy with force and do not follow through because the public 
views this as a sign of incompetence. This theory further argues that though public opinion does tie the leader’s 
hands to follow through with their threats, it also causes leaders to credibly communicate its resolve to its 
adversaries, who realize the leader has increased their domestic costs. This may cause adversaries to back down, 
thus nulling the need for the leader to actually use force without having to pay those domestic costs. See: Fearon, 
James D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” The American Political 
Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92; GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA, and ALASTAIR SMITH. “Honest 
Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 1, 2002): 175–200. For a study on how support for intervention depends on whether 
the electorate is politically informed or not, see: Sirin, Cigdem V. “Examining the Effects of Political 
Information and Intervention Stages on Public Support for Military Interventions: A Panel Experiment.” Acta 
Politica 46, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 261–93.  
43 Baum, Matthew A. “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope.” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 187–226. 
44 Ibid.   
45 Hildebrandt, Timothy, Courtney Hillebrecht, Peter M. Holm, and Jon Pevehouse. “The Domestic Politics of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology.” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 3 (July 
1, 2013): 243–66; Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Benjamin I. Page. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” The 
American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107–23.  
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crisis in Darfur, which began in 2003 leading to the eventual deployment of a peacekeeping 
force in July 2007.46  
I consider that all of the above explanations which purport to explain why, how, and when 
interventions occur hold merit, and in the interest of capturing all factors which have led 
Canada to either participate in a military intervention or refrain from doing so, I use a theory 
of military intervention which captures both motives and constraints as well as international 
and domestic factors.   
V. Analytical Framework 
1. Neoclassical Realist Theory of Intervention 
The theory I use for my analysis is the neoclassical realist (NCR) approach to foreign 
policy. I use NCR for two main reasons. First, this theory allows me to consider pressures 
internal and external to the state which produce a decision to either conduct a military 
intervention or refrain from doing so. Second, this theory discusses why a state may intervene 
militarily, which is the crux of my research question. This theory provides the broad 
analytical framework within which I will conduct my research; I therefore adapt this theory to 
Canadian foreign policy by considering pressures internal and external to Canada which have 
traditionally guided its foreign policy.   
                                                 
46Black, David R., and Paul D. Williams. The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur. 
Routledge, 2010. For details about the UN peacekeeping force, see: “UNAMID Facts and Figures - African 




Neoclassical realism suggests an approach which considers both pressures from the 
international system, and the internal dynamics of states. According to the NCR theory on 
military intervention, the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) first considers their perception of 
the national interest; if intervention is deemed to be in the national interest, it will occur, but 
will be subject to domestic constraints and incentives.47 According to this theory, domestic 
constraints matter in that they will not have a decisive impact on whether an intervention will 
occur or not, but they can affect the intervention’s timing, implementation, and public 
representation.48 
NCR theory states that the decision to conduct a military intervention is based on a threat 
to the national interest.49 NCR theory shares some chief assumptions with structural realist 
(neorealist) theory, namely that the international system is anarchic and that states seek to 
protect their security from external threats. The FPE uses military intervention as a tool to 
protect their security, which is their chief national interest.50 NCR theory concedes that the 
FPE’s conception of the national interest is subjective and “may be misguided,”51 but is 
genuine in that the FPE believes it is acting in the state’s best interest. NCR theory thus posits 
that developments abroad can represent a threat to national interests, and this is when a 
military intervention becomes a viable tool to protect the state. 
                                                 
47 Dueck, Colin. “Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major 
Military Interventions.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009: 139.  
48 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, 
and foreign policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Lobell, Steven E, Ripsman, 
Norrin M., and Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 25-26.  
49 Dueck, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest,” 146.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.  
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NCR theory departs from structural realism in that it concedes that domestic pressures 
have a measurable role to play in the decision to conduct a military intervention. 
Domestic actors can apply pressure which may impact the timing, implementation, or 
public representation of a military intervention. These domestic groups can be interest groups, 
or lobby groups. Domestic groups are motivated by different reasons; for instance, while 
some groups may seek to change social policy, others (such as corporate lobbyists) may be 
primarily driven by economic interests. The groups which matter most are, first, those which 
can actually provide a significant amount of electoral clout; these are large groups who are 
able to influence their members, and who hold members in strategic voting regions.52 For 
instance, corporate lobby groups in Quebec or Ontario may be more successful in influencing 
their Members of Parliament (MP) than corporate lobby groups with MPs in provinces less 
represented in the Canadian Parliament.  
The international circumstances also affect to what extent these groups will be able to 
influence foreign policy. The ideal environment for the maximization of influence by 
domestic actors is, predictably, during “stable periods when the state faces a low-threat 
international environment”.53 This is intuitively convincing, because in a low-threat 
international environment, the FPE can make more concessions to its domestic actors, thus 
appeasing groups and increasing approval for foreign policies, with significantly less risk. In a 
high-threat international environment, it would naturally follow that domestic actors will be 
                                                 
52  Ripsman, Norrin M. “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups.” In Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 181.  
53 Ibid, 186.  
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less successful at influencing the FPE. In any event, the main way in which domestic actors 
can actually influence the FPE is its voting power. This means that timing is very important, 
because domestic interest groups will be much more effective if a government is close to an 
election and, thus, vulnerable.54 Domestic actors will have a much stronger impact if the FPE 
is uncertain about the direction policy should take. A high degree of certainty within the FPE 
leaves very little wiggle-room for domestic groups to influence policy.55 Influence by 
domestic groups does not happen solely near election time, however. Apart from attempting 
to influence their MPs, corporate lobbying groups may use their money and political 
connections to influence policy.56  
NCR theory thus posits that military interventions are tools used by states in response to 
an external threat to their perception of the national interest. Four points must be adapted to 
Canadian foreign policy so I may conduct my analysis. First, I must define Canada’s national 
interest; second, I must determine which threats traditionally undermine Canada’s interests; 
finally, I must demonstrate how domestic pressure is manifested in the Canadian democratic 
system. NCR theory provides the framework within which I will conduct my analysis, and 
adapting this theory to Canadian foreign policy will allow me to evaluate why Canada 
decided to conduct a military intervention in one foreign state, and not in another. 
                                                 
54 Ibid, 187-188.  
55 Ibid, 188.  
56 Rheault, Ludovic. “Corporate Lobbying and Immigration Policies in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 46, no. 3 (September 2013): 691–722; Mcmenamin, Iain. “If 
Money Talks, What Does It Say? Varieties of Capitalism and Business Financing of Parties.” World Politics 64, 
no. 1 (January 7, 2012): 1–38; Maher, Stephen. “The Capitalist State, Corporate Political Mobilization, and the 
Origins of Neoliberalism.” Critical Sociology 43, no. 4–5 (July 1, 2017): 779–97. 
25 
 
2. Canada’s National Interests 
In its last International Policy Statement in 2005, Canada identified two key interests 
which continue to be relevant to the study of military intervention: maintaining international 
stability and promoting economic prosperity.57 These interests did not change with the arrival 
of Harper’s Conservative Party to power in 2006. Indeed, documents issued by the Harper 
government, such as the Economic Action Plan58 and the Canada First Defence Strategy 
(CFDS), reiterated the importance of these two objectives.59 
Threats to Canada are those which target these national interests. In the post 9/11 
international environment, international stability could potentially be threatened by 
transnational actors (such as terrorist groups) and revisionist actors (including Russia and 
Iran). Threats to economic prosperity include large scale disruptions in international finances 
and trade, such as the 2008 economic crisis.  
i. International Stability  
According to the IPS, Canada’s interest in maintaining international stability can be 
threatened by failed, fragile, and revisionist states, terrorism and organized crime, and the 
                                                 
57 “Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.” Policy Statement. 
Ottawa, Ontario: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005. 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/FR4-4-2005E.pdf: 2; Most democracies depend on a stable 
international environment, per Jacoby, Tami Amanda. “Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: Canadian 
Democracy and the Campaign against Global Terrorism.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 11, no. 3 (January 
1, 2004): 67.  
58 “Harper Outlines Key Parts of His Economic Action Plan.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
https://www.conservative.ca/harper-outlines-key-parts-of-his-economic-action-plan-2/. 
59 Government of Canada, National Defence. “Canada First Defence Strategy.” Government of Canada, May 12, 
2008. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page.  
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proliferation of WMDs.60 Under the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the threat 
of ‘Islamicism’ was also identified as another factor of potential instability.61  
Since Canada is a middle power, it has opted to work collaboratively with others to 
maintain international stability. Canada’s first partner in this realm is the US. Since the mid-
1980s, Canada has not owned weapons of mass destruction and is currently protected by the 
US’ “nuclear umbrella”.62 Short of nuclear threats, for which it relies on the US’s “nuclear 
umbrella”, Canada contributes to protection against threats to North America through 
participation in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a pact which 
places “under joint command the air forces of Canada and the United States”.63 Canada also 
helps protect border security, particularly since the terrorist attacks which targeted New York 
and Washington D.C. in September 2001.64 As will be described further in the analysis, 
                                                 
60 Ibid, 9.  
61 Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. “Navigating Troubled Waters: Canada in the Arab World.” In Elusive Pursuits: Lessons 
From Canada’s Interventions Abroad. Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2015: 42.   
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operational or active. See “Canada vs United States: Military Facts and Stats.” Accessed June 1, 2017. 
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63 Granatstein, J. L. “NORAD.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed August 21, 2017. 
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64 Canada’s homeland security is also closely intertwined with that of the US.  9/11 was a turning point for 
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Canada. Concerns about border security continue to shape Canadian foreign policy. In 2001, Canada signed the 
“Smart Border” agreement with the US, the goal of which was to improve border security and information 
sharing between the two states. See Doug Struck, “Canada Fights Myth It Was 9/11 Conduit 
(Washingtonpost.com).” Accessed March 16, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38816-
2005Apr8.html and “McCain Defends Napolitano, Insists 9/11 Perpetrators Came from Canada.” CBC News. 
Accessed March 16, 2017. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/mccain-defends-napolitano-insists-9-11-perpetrators-
came-from-canada-1.830149. Originally found in Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 33; Kitchen, 
Veronica, and Karthika Sasikumar. “Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada Relations and Counter-
Terrorism Policy.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (January 5, 2009): 160; “U.S. - Canada Smart 




Canada remains engaged with the US in the war against Islamic extremism and this continues 
to shape Canadian foreign policy.   
Canada is militarily dependant on the US, because its smaller-scale economy causes 
its military budget to be much smaller than that of its neighbor to the south. Whereas the US’s 
military budget is worth over 682 US$ BN, Canada’s is 32 times smaller, standing at 21 US$ 
BN.65 The US military is larger and much more powerful than the Canadian Armed Forces. 
Indeed, the US’s armed forces personnel is 24 times the size of Canada’s; its battle tanks 37 
times more numerous than Canada’s; and its combat aircrafts 33 times as numerous as 
Canada’s.66  
Canada also collaborates with other partners to ensure international stability. Its largest 
security commitments are with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), comprised of 
27 other members.67 The NATO military alliance helps maintain international stability, a 
chief interest of all its members, by facilitating the creation of multilateral coalitions in 
response to international crises.68 Canada has honored its commitments by participating 
actively in NATO-led coalitions, most notably in Afghanistan and during the Kosovo crisis.69 
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Threats to international stability are manifested, first, by terrorist groups. Terrorist groups 
became high on Canada’s foreign policy agenda after 9/11. Global Affairs Canada describes 
counter-terrorism as “the first priority of the Government of Canada”.70 Post 9/11, like many 
other Western democracies, Canadian interests became focused on security in an 
unpredictable international environment plagued by violent transnational actors. While 
Canadian military resources do not allow the country to adopt especially interventionist 
policies, the government sought to reorganize the Department of National Defence to make it 
more relevant to the post-Cold War environment.71 The goal was to transform the Canadian 
Armed Forces (CAF) into “a very new, strategically relevant, operationally responsive and 
tactically decisive joint force”.72 Stated objectives were the protection of Canadians and of the 
bilateral relationship with the US, and the contribution to multilateral security and stability 
initiatives abroad.73 Canada’s largest counter-terrorism effort has been its contribution to the  
Operation Apollo, the name given to US-led military operations in Afghanistan which 
included counter-terrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda.74 Apart from actually engaging in 
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counter-terrorism operations abroad, Canada engages in information-sharing with other states, 
through the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS),75 and the Egmont Group.76  
International stability is also threatened by revisionist actors, most notably Russia and 
Iran. Revisionist actors seek to expand their influence and power beyond their borders. 
Unpredictable and potentially aggressive in their methods, they threaten international 
stability. Canada remains concerned with Russia due to its presence in the arctic and its 
annexation of Ukraine. Regarding Arctic sovereignty, long-standing territorial disputes have 
caused Canadian-Russian relations to sour. From 2009 to 2014, the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) made contact with Russian long-range bombers 
hovering close to Canadian airspace over 50 times.77 Canada has also taken a strong stance 
against Russian annexation of Ukraine, the first such blatant violation of a state’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Sanctions were imposed on 
any individuals or entities who were judged to have violated the “sovereignty or territorial 
integrity of Ukraine.”78 The CAF also launched operation UNIFIER, the military deployment 
of 200 CAF members to Ukraine to assist Ukrainian armed forces with military training.79  
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Canada’s concerns regarding Iran derive from the Islamic Republic’s sponsoring of 
terrorist groups and its nuclear programs. Iran, which is also strongly hostile towards Israel, 
and actively trains and finances groups which are opposed to the Hebrew state, including 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ).80 These groups are all 
recognized by the Canadian government as terrorist groups.81 Canada is also concerned with 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions; in 2002, Iranian opposition groups forming the National Council of 
Resistance of Iran (NCR-Iran) alleged that Iran had been developing nuclear weapons, in 
direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).82 While the Iranian 
government always insisted that it was developing nuclear capabilities for domestic use, this 
would trigger a crisis between Iran and the international community. It would take until 2015 
for a nuclear arms deal to be signed between Iran and “the P5+1”, which include the US, UK, 
France, China, and Russia plus Germany.83 Canada remained suspicious of Iran, however; 
Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird expressed his “deep skepticism” about the deal, notably 
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due to the revisionist stance of Iranian leaders towards Israel.84 Canada maintained its 
sanctions against Iran, only making slight modifications in response to UNSC Resolution 
2231.85 On January 5, 2012, Stephen Harper explicitly stated that Iran is the “world’s most 
serious threat to international peace.”86 
More generally, Canada estimates that Iran undermines international stability notably 
because it engages in proxy wars by arming terrorist groups opposed to Israel (such as 
Hezbollah and Hamas), and by supporting regimes hostile to the West, such as the Syrian 
regime.87  
ii. Economic Prosperity 
Canada’s second national interest is economic prosperity. Threats to economic 
prosperity emanate from fluctuating international markets and the interruption of a 
relationship with an important economic partner. Canada collaborates with other states to 
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mitigate these concerns. The US and Mexico are its most important economic partners88, with 
the Asian continent in second place, importing 13% of Canadian exports.89  
In an effort to promote economic prosperity, Canada seeks to maintain healthy 
economic ties with the US. As a part of the G8 and G20, Canada is one of the big economic 
players in the international system, but one that remains heavily reliant on the US. It therefore 
in Canada’s interest to prioritize the bilateral relationship with the US in an increasingly 
globalized world.90 Canada and the US are not equally dependent on each other; 
approximately 75% of Canadian exports go to the US91 while only 16% of US exports go to 
Canada.92 The Canadian economy is thus particularly sensitive to changes in US policy. An 
illustrative example is the softwood lumber dispute, which began in 1982. US lobby groups, 
composed of private owners of softwood lumber lots, successfully argued that the extent of 
federal and provincial subsidies on timber are unfair, and should be subject to a duty tariff.93 
This effectively reduced trade in softwood lumber between the two countries and took a very 
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serious toll on the industry in Canada. As an illustration, between 2004 and 2009, over 9,000 
jobs were lost in British Columbia.94  
Canada also has a vested interest in building and maintaining strong economic ties 
with other players in the international system. It is therefore important for Canada to 
participate in international commerce and strengthen Canada’s overseas networks.95 In an 
effort to diversify its economic partnerships, Canada announced the Canada-Gulf Cooperation 
Council Strategic Dialogue in 2013; this established a strategic partnership with Gulf 
countries to “promote mutual economic prosperity”, and it currently engages in trade with 
these countries.96 Canada also signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2015 along with 
12 other nations to create a free-trade zone among its signatories; the countries in its scope 
represent approximately 40% of the world’s economic output.97 In 2016, Canada also signed 
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the landmark Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA).98 
In order to prosper in global markets, Canada also relies on the stability of the 
international financial system. Canada collaborates with other economic players in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and other commercial agreements, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).99  
3. The Foreign Policy Executive in Canada 
The neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy discusses the importance of the Foreign 
Policy Executive in foreign policy decision-making. In Canada, the FPE is defined as the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the cabinets of relevant Ministers. The relevant ministers 
include the Ministry of Global Affairs (MGA) and the Department of National Defence 
(DND). The MGA is responsible for designing both long-term strategy and specific policy in 
response to challenges faced by Canada.100 Other responsibilities of the MGA include 
managing Canada’s international relations with other countries (as they pertain to diplomacy, 
economy, trade, and negotiations), and carrying out programs to expand Canada’s trade 
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relations, and to contribute to international development in developing countries.101 The DND 
is responsible for “all matters relating to national defence”, including the management and 
direction of the Canadian Forces.102 
4. Domestic Pressures in Canada 
A range of actors in Canada exert pressure on the government regarding its foreign 
policy; these include individual citizens, firms, and various associations of civil society.103  
Individual citizens exert pressure by their voting behavior, and by direct contact with 
their Members of Parliament (MPs); the MPs can then bring issues to Parliament and engage 
in debate. The role of an MP in Canada is indeed to be attuned to the needs of his/her 
constituency.104  
Firms and civil society associations may exert pressure through lobbying. These groups 
may have ethnic interests which shape their opinion on Canadian foreign policy.105 Some 
vocal diasporas may engage in ethnic lobbying for or against humanitarian intervention in 
their home countries.106 For instance, in an attempt to influence the Canadian government, the 
Serbian-Canadian community gathered “in large numbers” to oppose Canada’s contribution to 
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the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.107 English-Canadians and French-Canadians have 
also been known to adopt foreign policy preferences based on their ethnicity; whereas the 
English-Canadians held a more isolationist worldview, the French-Canadian community has 
traditionally supported Canada’s role in international peacekeeping operations.108   
 Some groups have material or economic interests; these actors may lobby the 
Canadian government to influence foreign policy as it pertains to business and economics.109 
For instance, the Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada110 has been known to lobby 
the Canadian government on matters of free trade agreements.111 
 Other groups may have altruistic interests, and attempt to influence the government’s 
stance on issues of human rights abroad.112 For instance, in response to the killings of pro-
democracy protestors by the Chinese government in 1989, Canadians organized massive 
protests, most notably in Toronto, Halifax, and Vancouver.113  
The NCR theory of military intervention thus provides the framework within which I 
will present my empirical evidence. I consider pressures external to Canada which have 
provoked the decision to either conduct a military intervention in Libya or refrain from doing 
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so in Syria. Next, I evaluate whether there were domestic pressures regarding the Libyan 
intervention which may have affected the timing, implementation, or representation of the 
intervention. I evaluate domestic pressures for Syria as well, to determine whether the 
intervention was possibly delayed due to domestic pressure.  
VI. Methodology 
I use the comparative method to conduct my research with the use of case studies. The 
comparative method serves to highlight similarities and contrasts in seemingly similar 
cases.114 I seek to compare two similar phenomena which produced two different outcomes. 
At the origin of the revolutions in the Arab world, Canada reacted differently to similar crises. 
Though there were regional differences in the way the conflicts evolved, their genesis was 
caused by the same grievances; corrupt regimes, nepotism, high unemployment, and lack of 
accountability by government. Moreover, modern communications technology and social 
media played a big role in allowing for masses of individuals to gather rather quickly.115 My 
case selection was prompted by the identification of two cases that seemed worthy of 
comparison because they presented several similarities yet prompted completely different 
responses from the Canadian government. In early 2011, Canada participated in a multilateral 
NATO operation in Libya which culminated in the toppling of the regime and the death of 
President Gaddafi. Canada’s reaction in Libya was quick. In Syria, however, Canada stalled 
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for months, only imposing travel and economic sanctions in May 2011 against members of 
the Syrian government.116  
My methodology is qualitative. My research includes both primary and secondary 
sources. My primary sources include Parliamentary debate transcripts, official government 
statements, public interviews, and eyewitness testimony from international organizations such 
as Amnesty International. My secondary sources include journal articles, books, newspaper 
articles, and publications by international organizations and think-tanks. Limited tertiary 
sources are also used in the form of textbooks. With these sources, I will submit both the 
Libya and Syria cases to a rigorous and identical qualitative analysis. This qualitative analysis 
is based on the analytical framework of my research, and will seek to describe the external 
and internal factors which led to decisions to intervene or to refrain from intervening. 
VII. Case Studies 
1. Anatomy of the Crises 
In this section, I describe the crises in Libya and Syria within the broader context of the 
Arab Spring. I also provide details surrounding Canada’s response to the crises.  
                                                 




i. The Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia, in the weeks leading up to 2011.117 On December 
17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in a flammable liquid and set himself on fire.118 
The suicide was a protest against a government which had long neglected to care for its 
people. A merchant who sold produce out of a small cart, whose daily wages amounted to 7 
USD,119 Bouazizi was struggling to support his extended family. He committed suicide 
following the confiscation of his produce by a city official who claimed he did not hold a 
vendor’s license.120 His words to the city official during the scuffle are extremely telling. 
“Why are you targeting me?” he asked. “If I paid you bribes, you wouldn’t target me”.121 
Bouazizi was referring to the rampant corruption that had developed under the authoritarian 
regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1983-2011).  
Bouazizi eventually perished in an area hospital, but his suicide set in motion a chain 
of events which is commonly known as the Arab Spring. Protests erupted all over Tunisia and 
eventually turned into a full-fledged revolution as citizens expressed their deep dissatisfaction 
with the state of the country. Unemployment was soaring, especially among the youths.122 
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There was no political freedom and Ben Ali’s government was regularly accused of arresting 
and mistreating political opponents.123 Indeed, the government’s response to protestors in 
2011 contributed to transforming demonstrations into a revolution; government forces 
cracked down on peaceful dissidents arbitrarily detaining them and locking them up on fake 
or overblown charges.124 As Ben Ali was ousted from power, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, 
and Syria began in turn to experience pro-democracy protests.125  
ii. The Libyan Uprising and Canada’s Involvement 
 After demonstrations began in Libya, the country’s descent into a civil conflict was 
quick. In what follows, I provide a brief overview of the political and socioeconomic 
grievances which culminated in the Libyan uprisings. I then follow up with a description of 
key events in the uprisings, and conclude this section with a discussion of the NATO response 
and Canada’s contribution to the NATO effort. 
 Though socioeconomic grievances played a role in the Libyan uprisings, the most 
important grievances in Libya were political. Indeed, Gaddafi’s government suppressed 
political dissent and was unaccountable to the public. By the time the uprisings began, 
Gaddafi had ruled the country with an iron fist for forty years,126 using fear as a tool to 
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suppress opposition or challenges to his government. A military commander, Gaddafi 
overthrew the government of King Idris and established the Jamahiriya in 1969.127 The stated 
purpose of the new Libyan state was to establish a “state of the masses,” a type of direct 
democracy; in reality, however, citizens could not challenge the regime.128 Multiple attempts 
to do so were suppressed notably in the late 1980s and early 1990s when a militant group, the 
Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), was formed and managed to grow undetected by 
Gaddafi’s forces with the objective to overthrow the Libyan leader and establish Islamic 
rule.129 When Gaddafi’s forces discovered the LIFG and other smaller militant groups130, they 
eradicated them by arresting “anyone suspected of having the slightest sympathy with the 
cause”.131 As a show of force and a warning to Libyans, the revolutionary committees, which 
were mandated by Qaddafi to destroy any opposition to the Jamahiriya,132 killed suspected 
Islamists and paraded their bodies in the streets.133  
The Libyan government was also unaccountable to the public. This was due to 
nepotism and cronyism in both formal (such as the military and security organizations) and 
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informal (i.e. organizations that were never defined in the constitution) state structures. 
Indeed, Gaddafi put relatives of his in charge of the Libyan military while military personnel 
was selected from members of tribes close to Gaddafi.134 Three informal structures were also 
headed by members of Gaddafi’s inner circle: the Free Unionist Officers’ Movement, the 
Forum of Companions of Gaddafi, and the People’s Social Leadership Committees.135 These 
organizations were instrumental in ensuring regime control by ruling over the districts, filling 
important civilian posts, and maintaining “social stability within the Jamahiriya by 
controlling both family and tribal members”.136  
While there were many political grievances vis-à-vis the regime, socioeconomic 
grievances were mitigated by Libya’s oil wealth which allowed the country to achieve the 
highest Human Development Index rating and GDP per capita of any country in Africa.137 
Nevertheless, by 2010, the Corruptions Perceptions Index gave Libya a 14 on a scale from 0 
to 100, where 0 represents a highly corrupt regime and 100 reflects full transparency and 
accountability.138 In 2011, Libya had no political parties, independent media, or trade unions, 
and despite the country’s successful economic standing vis-à-other African countries, 
unemployment was high, especially among youth.139 
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 It is in this context that protest movements broke out in Benghazi, Libya’s second 
largest city, in January 2011.140 Gaddafi’s government responded to protests with an 
excessive amount of force. On February 17th, the “Day of Rage”, a peaceful demonstration 
was organized near a police station in Tripoli to protest the treatment of demonstrators, most 
notably the arrest of lawyer and human rights militant Fathi Terbil.141 Demonstrators called 
for Gaddafi to step down and they demanded that the government free political prisoners who 
had been arbitrarily detained.142 Government forces responded with an inordinate amount of 
force, shooting into the crowd with tanks and helicopters, and executing militants who refused 
to obey orders.143 Throughout the month of February, violent confrontations continued. 
Gaddafi’s forces weakened as military units defected; this helped arm the opposition.144 Rebel 
forces gained control of some western cities, including Benghazi, whereas Tripoli and the 
surrounding areas remained under government control.145 Clashes concentrated in the coastal 
regions, as government and rebels battled for control of the oil exporting ports.146  
On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 condemning 
the Libyan government’s response to protestors, imposing an arms embargo, and enforcing a 
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freeze on the assets of members of the Libyan government.147 Two weeks later, on 17 March 
2011, the UNSC issued a second resolution (1973) which called for “all necessary measures” 
to protect civilians, imposed a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on members of the Libyan 
government.148  
In response to UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) 
began on 19 March 2011.149 OOD was a ‘coalition of the willing’, led by the United States but 
included members from Italy, France, Canada and the United-Kingdom. 150 The operation’s 
mandate was to impose the arms embargo and no-fly zone, and to protect civilians from 
Gaddafi’s forces. Practically speaking, the Operation lent assistance to the opposition in their 
fight against Gaddafi’s forces. OOD conducted surveillance operations in the Mediterranean 
with Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS)151, provided humanitarian assistance, 
and prevented Gaddafi’s forces from advancing on rebel-held territory.152 On March 31st, 
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command and control of the operation, now called Operation Unified Protector (OUP), was 
transferred to NATO on March 31st; the mandate, however, remained unchanged.153 On 
October 31st, OUP had concluded; the opposition was in control of the entire state after 
opposition forces successfully attacked Gaddafi’s strongholds in Tripoli and Sirte.154  
Canada’s involvement in Libya began on February 24, 2011, when the Government of 
Canada requested that a CC-177 Globemaster strategic airlifter based in Germany remain on 
stand-by for a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), the goal of which would be to 
evacuate Canadian citizens from Libya.155 The next day, Operation MOBILE began; the 
operation’s initial mandate was to evacuate both Canadians and other foreign nationals from 
Libya.156 In response to the passing of UNSC Resolution 1970, Parliament amended the 
Special Economic Measures Act of Canada (S.C. 1992, c. 17) that same day to include the 
Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Libya.157 This triggered the 
implementation of Canadian sanctions on Libya, which included an arms embargo and asset 
freeze.158 However, the Canadian government took sanctions one step further. Because 
UNSCR 1970 had declared an asset freeze only on Gaddafi and specific members of his 
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family,159 Canada added “Libya” as a designated entity impacted by the asset freeze in order 
to impose these measures on the Libyan government itself, plus its institutions and 
agencies.160 Two days after the issuing of UNSC Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, 
Operation MOBILE became a combat mission, joining the US-led Operation Odyssey Dawn, 
the mandate of which was enforcement of the no-fly zone mentioned in UNSCR 1973.161 On 
March 22nd, 2011, Operation MOBILE merged with Operation Unified Protector which 
formally began operations on March 31st, 2011.162 Canadian Lieutenant-General Charlie 
Bouchard led the OUP NATO coalition which eventually toppled Gaddafi’s regime.163 
Canada deployed a total of seven CF-18 fighter jets, two refueling airplanes, four transports 
                                                 
159 The designated personnel affected by the asset freeze were listed in Annex II of UNSCR 1970, and included 
the following members of the Gaddafi family: Aisha (daughter), Hannibal (son), Khamis (son), Mohammad Abu 
Minyar (leader of the Revolution), Mutassim (son and National Security advisor), Saif al-Islam (son and Director 
of the Gaddafi Foundation). See “Resolution 1970 (2011).” United Nations Security Council, February 26, 2011. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011).  
160 Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada. “Canadian Sanctions Related to 
Libya,” February 28, 2011. http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-pays/libya-libye.aspx?lang=eng.   
161 Government of Canada, National Defence. “Operation MOBILE,” July 22, 2013. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile.page.  
162 Ibid.  
163 “Charles Bouchard on the Canadian Forces, NATO, and What We Learned in Libya.” OpenCanada. 




(two tactical, two heavy), and two maritime patrol aircraft.164 Prime Minister Harper 
described Canada’s contribution as “punching above its weight” militarily.165 
iii. The Syrian Uprising and Canada’s Involvement 
 The Syrian uprising began two months after the Libyan uprising, and response by the 
international community was delayed in comparison to the response to the Libyan crisis. I 
provide a brief history of the grievances which culminated in the Syrian uprisings. I then 
follow-up with a description of key events in the uprisings and Canada’s subsequent 
involvement. 
 When the uprisings began in Damascus, the capital of Syria, the Al-Assad family had 
been at the helm of the country since Hafiz al-Assad, the father of the current Syrian leader 
Bashar al-Assad, came to power in 1970.166 Before rising to power, Hafiz al-Assad was a 
member of the Ba’ath party, a political party founded on ideals of Arab nationalism and 
socialism, and pan-Arabism.167 In intra-party coup occurred in 1966, causing al-Assad to now 
occupy a senior position in the Ba’ath party as defense minister and commander of the air 
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force.168 In 1970, al-Assad assumed the top political position and stabilized a regime which 
had experienced an average of almost one coup per year since 1949.169 Stability came at a 
price, however, as there was little room for political dissent; al-Assad developed a police state 
apparatus, the goal of which was to shut down any opposition to his regime.170 Through the 
use of police, military forces, and security services (mukhabarat), al-Assad created 
omnipresent fear of the regime. The security apparatus especially was “pervasive and 
omnipotent”, discouraging opposition; where a country like Canada will have approximately 
200 police officers for every 100,000 citizens, the ratio of mukhabarat officers in Syria was 
approximately 1 officer for every 240 citizens.171 Syrians had reason to be afraid of opposing 
the regime; in 1982, an insurrection supported by the Muslim Brotherhood provoked an 
aggressive response by al-Assad, who sent a paramilitary force into Hama, killing an 
estimated 10,000 to 30,000 civilians.172 
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Power was transferred to Bashar al-Assad in 2000, when Hafiz al-Assad died.173 
Syrians were optimistic when Bashar took over as President; he claimed he desired to 
modernize Syria, not necessarily turning it into a Western-style democracy, but into a 
democracy “specific to Syria”.174 For a brief period between 2000 and 2001 known as the 
Damascus Spring, there were vocal demands by a group of Syrian intellectuals for political, 
legal, and economic reforms which included the implementation of a multiparty 
democracy.175 While the regime seemed initially willing to make some concessions, it would 
quickly change its course, closing political forums that had until then been tolerated and 
imprisoning prominent members of the Damascus Spring movement.176 A few years later, in 
2005, opposition groups tried to engage the regime on the issue of reforms and drafted the 
Damascus Declaration, demanding a multiparty democracy in Syria; al-Assad responded by 
imprisoning the leading signatories of the Declaration.177 By 2010, Human Rights Watch 
reported that “authorities [in Syria] continued to broadly violate the civil and political rights 
of citizens, arresting political and human rights activists, censoring websites, detaining 
bloggers, and imposing travel bans.”178 
Economically, Hafiz al-Assad had left behind a socialist economy that was threatened 
by globalization, with a large public sector, inefficient state-owned enterprises, and poor 
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private sector business initiatives and entrepreneurship due to strict regulations.179 In an 
interview with international newspaper Asharq al-Awsat in February 2001, Bashar Al-Assad 
stated that his first priority would be to “see Syria more prosperous”.180 Bashar made some 
attempts at liberalizing the economy; notably, private banks were established in 2004, loan 
interest rates were cut, and the stock exchange was established in 2009.181 The economic 
liberalization, however, mostly benefited al-Assad and his inner circle, as Syrians continued 
to face economic hardships.182 Another important economic issue facing Syria was its heavy 
reliance on its agricultural production, which plummeted since droughts began in 2006.183 
From 2006 to 2011, devastating droughts severely impacted the agricultural sector, causing 
crop failures and livestock devastation.184 At least 1 million farmers could no longer pursue 
their livelihood, and were forced to seek other employment or simply abandon their lands.185 
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A large rural exodus ensued, and unemployment was rampant.186 In urban areas, the drought 
and over-population caused water scarcity, most notably in Daraa.187  
In 2010, the World Bank ranked Syria 143rd out of 183 countries regarding “the ease of 
doing business”; that same year, Transparency International gave Syria a corruption score of 
2.5/10, where 10 represents “very clean”.188 Damascus had little incentive in actually 
improving the economy; as mentioned, profits of corruption benefited the government and its 
inner circle.189 The result of Syria’s poor economic performance and backwards economy is 
very low foreign and domestic investment and economic interest in the state.190 
Above these socioeconomic grievances, political grievances persisted throughout 
Bashar’s reign. The mukhabarat remained omnipresent, arbitrarily detaining and even 
torturing citizens.191 In an attempt to strengthen his regime, Bashar al-Assad appointed 
members of his family and a group of young officers from his Alawite community to 
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positions of power.192 It is in the context of these economic and political grievances that the 
uprisings began in 2011.  
The Syrian uprising began on March 15th, when a demonstration was held in 
Damascus to protest the arrest of ten schoolchildren in Daraa who had borrowed the “Down 
with the regime” slogan from the Egyptian revolution and written it on a wall.193 Between 
March 18th and 20th, police officers in Daraa caused the death of five people and injured one 
while they fired into crowds.194  On March 27, 2011, Al-Assad deployed the Army.195 A 
large-scale military operation was conducted in April 2011 for 11 days in Daraa, killing 115 
residents.196 In May, the city of Banyas was the subject of another large-scale military 
operation, which forced over 3,000 residents to flee.197 In July 2011, the city of Hama saw the 
largest anti-government protests which had occurred so far; al-Assad’s forces conducted 
another military operation, killing 200 residents.198 The regime’s consistent use of excessive 
force against protestors triggered the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on July 29, 
2011; this was a group of Sunni-sponsored army defectors and exiled opposition members.199 
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Throughout the conflict, al-Assad, who had a vested interest in defaming the opposition, 
perpetuated the narrative that the opposition was led by extremists.200 By November 2011, 
Human Rights Watch reported the arbitrary detention of thousands of protestors, and a death 
toll of 3,500.201 These killings occurred during protests, sit-ins, and funeral processions.202 
Throughout the crisis, victims were often denied medical assistance (some even taken out of 
hospitals mid-surgery), and activists and journalists were arbitrarily detained.203 
In response to the government’s use of force against its people, Canada adopted a 
containment policy but refrained from intervening; this was also EU and US’s strategy. 
Canada did impose sanctions on the regime on May 24, 2011, which included “asset freezes 
and travel bans on key regime figures, banning specific imports and exports, and suspending 
all bilateral cooperation agreements and initiatives.”204 Between 2011 and 2012, the EU had 
also imposed sanctions on al-Assad’s regime, with the stated objectives of increasing pressure 
on the regime to end repression, withdrawing troops from occupied cities, and implementing 
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democratic reforms.205 The US also adopted sanctions; between April and August 2011, the 
U.S. Government issued Executive Orders 13572, 13573, and 13582 with the stated goals of 
depriving “the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians” and to 
“allow for a democratic transition”.206  
Canada’s tone, like that of the EU and US, became more threatening over the course 
of the crisis. In June 2011, Foreign Minister John Baird released a statement calling for Al-
Assad to “reform or step down”207, but by August 2011, Harper joined the US and EU – who, 
by that point, had also refrained from intervening – in requesting Al-Assad’s resignation.208 In 
September 2012, Canada listed Syria as a state supporter of terrorism, and added more 
sanctions which affected 129 individuals and 44 entities.209  
In 2014, Harper clearly stated that Canada would not join any effort to topple Al-
Assad’s regime, even if the US was keen on doing so; Harper stated that Canada would limit 
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its involvement in Syria to the fight against ISIL.210 In September 2014, an American-led 
intervention began in Syria; its purpose was limited to eliminating the ISIL threat.211 By 
October 7, 2014, Canada had already made limited contributions to the anti-ISIL effort in 
Iraq, delivering military supplies to forces, and deploying members of the Canadian Forces to 
Iraq to advise security forces.212 On October 7, 2014, Harper announced that Canada would 
join the American-led coalition in Iraq, eventually deploying “six CF-18 Hornet fighter-
bombers, a CC-150 Polaris aerial tanker, and two Auroras for surveillance and reconnaissance 
missions”.213 In March 2015, the military mission was expanded to Syria and 30 officers were 
deployed to coalition headquarters.214 Some EU members had also joined the coalition, 
notably Denmark, France, Germany, and the UK.215 Though many NATO members were 
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already part of the American-led coalition to defeat ISIL, NATO formally joined the coalition 
on May 25, 2017.216 
iv. Canada’s reaction to the Libyan and Syrian uprisings in comparative 
perspective 
 In the wake of the Arab Spring, Syria and Libya experienced pro-democracy protests. 
While Libya’s uprising began in January 2011, Syria experienced its first demonstrations in 
March. The uprisings were similar in that they erupted as a response to nepotism, 
unemployment, and a lack of accountability by government. In both states, government forces 
responded with an inordinate amount of force and caused the death of thousands of protestors 
and opposition members. However, Canada’s response to the crises was different: while 
Canada intervened almost immediately in Libya and participated actively in the coalition 
which toppled Gaddafi’s regime, it “sat on its hands” in Syria and avoided a military 
intervention. Per NCR theory, the decision to conduct a military intervention is driven 
primarily by a threat to the intervening state’s national interests. However, the timing, 
implementation, and public representation of the intervention could be affected by domestic 
pressures.  
 My research demonstrates that Canada intervened in Libya because its national 
interests were at stake, and it faced no domestic pressure against the intervention. I also 
suggest that a third factor which motivated Canada to conduct a military intervention in Libya 
was the low-risk nature of the mission. In contrast, I argue that Canada did not conduct a 
                                                 




military intervention in Syria because its national interests were not at stake, and Canada 
faced no strong domestic pressure to act. Further, I suggest that contrarily to the intervention 
in Libya, involvement in the Syrian conflict was very high-risk.  
2. Explaining Canada’s Intervention in Libya 
Military intervention will generally occur when the FPE determines that national interests 
are at stake. In the case of Canada, and as discussed above, these interests include 
international stability and security, and economic prosperity. Furthermore, though domestic 
pressure may shape the timing and logistics of a military intervention, it will not have a 
decisive impact on the decision to intervene or not.  
I make four separate arguments regarding Canada’s reasons for intervening in Libya. I 
first argue that Canada’s decision to intervene was primarily motivated by a threat to 
international stability, a threat which the NATO coalition could help mitigate. I also argue 
that as a middle power, Canada felt a responsibility towards NATO and the United Nations to 
participate in the coalition. I further argue that threats to Canada’s economic interests in Libya 
facilitated its decision to intervene. Finally, I argue that the Canadian government faced no 
domestic pressure against the intervention.  
i. The Threat to International Stability  
 Before the uprising, Libya did not constitute a threat to international stability. Indeed, 
Gaddafi’s relationship with the West had actually improved in the twenty-first century. 
However, Gaddafi’s treatment of his own population during the 2011 uprisings constituted 
what the UNSCR 1973 called “crimes against humanity”; as per chapter VII of the Charter of 
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the United Nations, this constituted a threat to international peace and security.217 Thus, this 
posed a threat to Canada’s interest in maintaining a stable international environment, a threat 
which the NATO coalition could lessen or eradicate.     
 Historic tensions developed between Gaddafi and the West, but improved in the 
twenty-first century. Tensions had developed due to Libya’s involvement the Pan Am Flight 
103 terrorist attack, and its possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).  
In 1988, a bomb exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on a Pan American World 
Airways flight en route to London; two hundred and fifty-nine passengers were killed, and 
among them were three Canadians, along with English, French, American, and Scottish 
citizens.218 As of 1990, two Libyan citizens were suspected of participating in the bombing.219 
The United States, France, and the UK demanded that Gaddafi hand over the two suspects, 
but Gaddafi’s government refused, mocking the evidence and calling it “less than a laughable 
piece of fingernail”.220 In response to Gaddafi’s refusal to hand over the suspects, the UNSC 
imposed an air and arms embargo and hindered Libya’s ability to import certain oil equipment 
from abroad.221  
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The West was also concerned with Libya’s attempt to produce unconventional 
weapons and WMDs, despite Libya having ratified and signed the NPT in 1975.222 In 1997, 
the CIA confirmed that Libya’s attempts to acquire chemical weapons had stalled, but that the 
North African state continued to attempt the acquisition of missile and nuclear technology.223 
In 2001, concern grew after the Russian-Libyan nuclear program was renewed; the CIA 
warned this could lead to weapons-related research.224 This was confirmed in 2004, when 
Gaddafi admitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that in the late 90s and 
early 2000s, Libya had acquired centrifuges, and built enrichment cascades (used to produce 
enriched uranium).225  
In the twenty-first century, Gaddafi took steps towards improving Libya’s relationship 
with the West. Since the September 11 attacks in the United-States, the US, Libya, and Britain 
had maintained low-key trilateral talks which had culminated in Libya’s announcement in 
2003 that it apologized for its involvement in the terrorist attack and would try the Lockerbie 
suspects, and that it was giving up its WMDs.226 It is unclear what provoked Libya’s attempts 
at improving relations with the West. Libya may have been deterred by the US’s invasion of 
Iraq, proving the US’s willingness to intervene in states which it suspected of developing 
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WMDs.227 It is also possible that Gaddafi, seeing potential revenue from Libya’s oil riches, 
sought to reverse economic sanctions imposed on Libya after the Lockerbie incident.228  
Though relations improved marginally in the 21st century, ambivalence towards 
Gaddafi persisted in Canada. A faux-pas by Gaddafi in August 2009 caused further disdain in 
the Canadian government; one of the bombers involved in the Lockerbie incident, Abdelbaset 
al-Megrahi, was released from prison in Scotland on compassionate grounds and received a 
hero’s welcome in Libya.229 One month later, Gaddafi was meant to visit Newfoundland on 
his way back to Libya from New York; the Prime Minister’s office said he could expect a 
“chilly reception” and that Minister Cannon would be meeting with the leader to express his 
“strong disapproval” over the hero’s welcome received by al-Megrahi.230 In 2010, MP Jim 
Abbott described Libya as a country “that you don't exactly have warm fuzzies about or send 
Christmas cards to”.231 At the very least, the Canadian government’s concerns about Libya 
were somewhat eased after Gaddafi stopped sanctioning terrorist groups. During discussions 
on February 16, 2011 (incidentally, the day before protests in Libya began) about sanctions in 
Iran, NDP MP Jim Maloway drew a parallel with Libya and stated that Gaddafi suffered from 
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sanctions until he “came forward and renounced terrorism and promised not to be involved in 
any more state-sponsored terrorism activities.”232 
In spite of slight improvements in Libya’s image abroad, its image was again tarnished 
when mobilizations against the government began in 2011. When the protest movements 
broke out in February 2011, Libya responded with an inordinate amount of force. Amnesty 
International reported that the protestors were unarmed, and that Gaddafi’s forces had gunned 
them down; between February 16 and 21, 1,500 were injured and 170 killed in Benghazi and 
al-Bayda.233 As of February 2011, the INGO reported that Gaddafi’s forces had initially 
launched indiscriminate rockets and bombs in neighbourhoods uninvolved in the fighting.234 
These indiscriminate attacks took place in late February, in the northwestern and northeastern 
parts of the state, blocking access to the ports, preventing access to humanitarian aid.235 
Gaddafi’s forces also engaged in execution-style killings of opposition forces, and used anti-
personnel, anti-vehicle, and other mines.236 By end of February, the UN Secretary General, 
Ban Ki Moon, reported that thousands had died.237 All over the country – in Benghazi, al-
Bayda, and Misratah – soldiers continued to shoot at unarmed protestors.238 February 2011 
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also saw Gaddafi’s forces using Grad rockets, cluster munitions, tanks, and heavy military 
vehicles and equipment, and launching indiscriminate assaults.239  
The international response made it clear that what was happening in Libya was 
considered a threat to international peace and security. UNSCR 1970, adopted on February 
26, 2011, called for the dispatch of an international commission to investigate violations of 
international human rights law, and explicitly mentioned the Council’s responsibility “for the 
maintenance of international peace”.240 UNSCR 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011, it 
explicitly mentioned acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.241 
Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes measures to be taken to “maintain or restore 
international peace and security”.242  
Though there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the crisis in Libya was 
considered a direct threat to Canada, it was considered a threat to international peace and 
security by the UN and NATO, two organizations with which Canada’s foreign policy has 
historically been tightly associated. When Harper released the Canada First Defence Strategy 
(CFDS), there was explicit mention of Canada’s commitment to international peace and 
security.243 The United Nations judged that the crisis in Libya threatened international 
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security; per Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, referenced in both UNSCR 
1970 and 1973, crimes against humanity threaten international peace and stability.244 For 
NATO, these crimes against humanity were the chief motivator behind their military 
intervention, as the mission’s stated purpose was “protecting civilians and civilian populated 
areas from attack or the threat of attack.”245 Because international stability is a chief Canadian 
national interest, and because both the UN and NATO considered the crisis to present a threat 
to international stability, this would undoubtedly have weighed in Canada’s assessment of the 
threat posed by the crisis in Libya.  
ii. Canada As a Middle Power 
Canada’s position as a middle power means it cannot afford to take unilateral military 
action, preferring instead to participate in multilateral efforts.246 As a middle power, Canada’s 
international behavior is defined by two main tendencies: the support of multilateral 
engagements, and the tendency to avoid a strong position in international disputes.247 Due to 
its vested interest in international stability, Canada’s strategy as a middle power is to lend 
assistance to those multilateral organizations which promote stability in the international 
system.248 I argue that Canada’s strategy as a middle power on the international scene 
contributed to Canada’s decision to participate in the NATO effort.  
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As a middle power, Canada cannot afford to conduct unilateral military interventions; 
as a result, it collaborates with multilateral organizations to do so. Its financial contributions 
to defence spending have not been very high, but Canada has nonetheless maintained an 
active role in NATO-led operations. Post-Cold War, Canada lagged behind other middle 
powers regarding its financial contribution to defence spending; where countries such as 
Belgium and Denmark contributed on average 1.6 and 1.7 percent of their GDP on defence 
(respectively), Canada contributed 1.4 percent.249 In 2011, Canada spent 1.5% of its GDP on 
defence.250 Canada has been unable to reach NATO’s target of 2% annual spend on GDP, but 
has held an active role since in the organization nonetheless. Since 1992, over 40,000 
Canadian military personnel served in NATO and UN-led operations in the Balkans to bring 
stability to the region.251 In 1999, Canada participated in the NATO-led mission by deploying 
500 military personnel and crew members for air and naval operations in Italy and the 
Adriatic Sea, and 1,300 soldiers for peacekeeping operations on the ground in Yugoslavia.252 
Between 2003 and 2014, Canada’s Operation Athena lent assistance to the UN-mandated, 
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NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 253 Of the 50,000 
soldiers deployed for ISAF, Canada stood as the fifth largest contributor out of over forty 
countries, behind the US, UK, Germany, and France.254  
Despite its military engagement in NATO operations, the Harper government was not 
as committed to its role in the United Nations. Indeed, Canada’s role as an active member in 
the UN peacekeeping operations declined under Harper. Until 1989, Canada had participated 
in every UN mission since 1947.255 Though its contributions began to plummet slowly as it 
moved into the 21st century, the year following Harper’s election (2007) marked a sharp 
decline in Canada’s rank among contributors to UN peacekeeping, where it dropped from 31st 
to 61st.256 Harper lent Canada’s participation mostly to multilateral forums that had the 
potential of advancing Canada’s interest, and the United Nations, was not one of his main 
priorities.257 In fact, when Harper spoke at the American Council for National Policy in 1997, 
he described Canada’s pride in being praised by UN bodies as distressing to “conservatives 
like myself.”258  
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If the Canadian government’s commitment to the UN and UN peacekeeping waivered 
under the Harper government, its commitment to NATO was crystal clear, as Canada readily 
backed the mission in Libya. When talks opened on March 21, 2011 in the House 
(culminating in the House unanimously backing Canada’s mission in Libya), Defence 
Minister Peter MacKay stated that "We are compelled to intervene, both [as] a moral duty and 
by duty [to] NATO and the United Nations.”259  
iii. The Threat to Economic Prosperity 
Economic prosperity is one of Canada’s major interests, and the situation in Libya at 
the wake of the revolts threatened this interest directly. In 2011, Canada held significant oil 
interests in Libya, and felt its economic interests threatened by the instability in the state. I 
argue that protection of its business interests in Libya facilitated its decision to intervene.  
 Libya is an oil-rich country whose history has been shaped by this resource. Libya 
is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the stated 
goal of which is to “coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries 
and ensure the stabilization of oil markets”.260 It holds Africa’s largest oil reserves, and in 
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2010, it was ranked 18th in the world for its daily oil production, behind Angola, Algeria, 
and Norway, but surpassing Kazakhstan and Qatar.261  
Canada holds substantial oil interests in Libya. In 2008, Petro-Canada (now 
Suncor, post-merger) signed a multi-billion dollar, thirty-year deal with the Libyan 
government.262 As of December 2011 (two months before the uprisings began), it was 
estimated that Suncor’s investments in Libya surpassed $900 million.263 Many other 
Canadian companies operate in Libya, and their projects are worth billions.264 Of note is 
SNC-Lavalin, which has consistently bid on projects in Libya since 2008; by February 
2011, SNC-Lavin held over $1.2 billion worth of contracts in Libya.265 In response to the 
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civil conflict in Libya, Suncor suspended operations due to this force majeure in 2011.266 
For the last three quarters of 2011, Suncor reported a $1.2 billion write-down on its Libyan 
assets due to the civil conflict halting operations; Libyan operations represent 
approximately 6% of Suncor’s total production.267  
Debates in Parliament suggested that Canadian MPs were aware of these interests 
and favored protecting them. Before the UNSC issued Resolution 1973 authorizing 
intervention in Libya, the Liberal MP for Scarborough-Agincourt requested an emergency 
debate on March 10 to discuss the situation in Libya; this request was motivated by 
concerns that the situation in Libya was beginning to have tangible repercussions on 
Canada, causing rising gas prices.268 A few months after the intervention began, on June 
14, 2011, Liberal MP Mark Eyking confirmed that the intervention in Libya was (and 
continued to be) beneficial for Canada, openly stating that “There will be a benefit for our 
companies as we get the oil industry back and get everything to work well in that area.”269 
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By January 31, 2012, stability had returned to the region and Suncor resumed its operations 
in Libya.270 
iv. Domestic Pressure 
Not only were Canada’s interests directly threatened, but the government faced no 
domestic pressure against the intervention. Parliamentary debates demonstrated cross-party 
support for the mission.  
On March 19th, 2011, in response to UNSCR 1970, Operation MOBILE had become a 
combat mission to enforce the no-fly zone with OOD, thus marking the beginning of 
Canadian combat operations in Libya.271 On March 21st, 2011, the House of Commons voted 
unanimously in favor of Canada’s participation in the UN-mandated mission in Libya; though 
Canada had already been actively involved in the enforcement of the no-fly zone, this 
decision would extend Canada’s mission to protect civilians “under threat of attack”.272 
Although Parliament was in support of the mission, the motion required that another vote be 
held in three months if the mission were to be extended.273 On June 14, 2011, the 
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Conservative motion to extend the mission for 3½ months passed by a vote of 294-1, with 
only Green Party leader Elizabeth May voting against.274 
v. Other considerations 
In the course of my research, I have identified other considerations which help explain 
Canada’s intervention policy in Libya. These explanations fall outside the purview of my 
analytical framework which is focused on national interests and domestic pressure. I consider 
these explanations to be important nonetheless. I suggest that Canada’s decision to intervene 
in Libya was facilitated by considerations that the intervention would be low-risk, due to 
Libyan geopolitics, Libya’s weak military, and its organized, liberal-leaning opposition. 
As demonstrated in my analysis, Canada’s interests (namely, international security and 
economic prosperity) were at stake in Libya, and the international community had given its 
green-light for intervention in the state. I argue that other considerations existed to facilitate 
the intervention, namely Libya’s isolation from its regional environment, the weakness of its 
military, and the liberal image that its opposition, which had organized quickly, was able to 
project.  
Both geographically and politically, Libya was isolated from key players, meaning 
Canada and its allies had no reason to fear backlash by an ally or conflict spillover. Libya is 
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sandwiched between two states – Egypt and Tunisia –   which were undergoing revolutions at 
the same time, and who as a result were also weak; conflict spillover was thus not a 
concern.275 Moreover, Libya did not have ties to any important allies. Gaddafi had alienated 
himself from the Arab League after years-long disagreements about the Arab League’s 
difficulty in presenting a unified front against Israel and the West.276 Gaddafi’s relations with 
African countries were also unstable, due to Gaddafi’s meddling in their internal affairs. For 
instance, Libya intervened in Chad in 1980; and in 1985, Gaddafi encouraged Muslims in 
Zaire to engage in a war against the regime.277 Relations with African countries improved 
slightly at the dawn of the 21st century, when Libya encouraged the creation of bilateral and 
multilateral organizations aimed at unifying the states in the African continent.278 However, 
African states were divided between those who were ambivalent towards Gaddafi’s regime 
and those who were accepting of it. Proof of this dichotomy were obvious when the crisis 
broke out in Libya in 2011; the African Union adopted a hands-off approach, split between 
supporters of Gaddafi and his opponents.279 Libya did not have any important allies in the 
Arab World, nor on the African continent.  
Further, the weakness of Libya’s military suggested the intervention in Libya would 
be low-risk. Part of the issue with Libya’s military was not its limited material capability, but 
its loyalty; only some 20% of the military was estimated to be loyal to Gaddafi, and the chain 
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of command was weak.280 Indeed, as of February 2011, members of the military began to 
defect to the opposition or simply abandon their posts.281  
The decision to intervene in Libya was also facilitated by the Libyan opposition, which 
had organized quickly. Libyan society had traditionally espoused a rather moderate vision of 
Islam,282 and out of this ideology emerged the National Transitional Council (NTC). When 
the opposition to the regime established the NTC in Bayda on February 24, 2011, they made it 
quite easy for western states, who now knew clearly with whom they could discuss. This 
group also allowed western states to get a good idea of who would likely take over power in a 
post-Gaddafi Libya. The NTC included technocrats who had defected from the regime and 
professionals.283 Notably, the appointed head of the NTC was Mustafa Abdeljalil, who was 
Gaddafi’s justice secretary; Ali Issawi, who became responsible for foreign affairs at the NTC 
and used to be the economy minister; and Mahmoud Jibril, who used to be at the head of 
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Gaddafi’s National Planning Council, and who became head of crisis management in the 
NTC.284 Members of the NTC were overwhelmingly liberal, and a great deal of them were 
previously members of Gaddafi’s government who had been part of a non-corrupt, 
progressive and reformist current.285 The NTC appeared non-threatening to the West. Not 
only were they liberals who spoke English, but they published a manifesto on March 29, 
2011, A Vision of a Democratic Libya, which expressed their desire to implement a modern 
liberal democracy.286 The NTC’s manifesto might as well have been written by any western 
state, close as it was to western political and social values. The document called for the 
“supremacy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Declarations,” requiring 
that the new democratic Libya be ruled by “the free will of the people, without exclusion or 
suppression of any voice.”287 The manifesto also called for freedom of expression, through 
any form, including “media, peaceful protests, demonstrations and sit-ins and other means of 
communication, in accordance with the constitution and its laws in a way that protests public 
security and social peace.”288 Indeed, this trust in the budding organization prompted western 
states to officially recognize the NTC as the legitimate governing body of the Libyan 
opposition. By November 30, 2011, 102 UN member states officially recognized the NTC. 
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These member states included France,289 Canada,290 the United-States,291 the United 
Kingdom,292 Switzerland,293 and Iceland.294 The NTC publicly advocated for a state based on 
“moderate Islam”.295 Indeed, standing before some 10,000 supporters in the Martyrs’ Square, 
Abdeljalil stated that Libya was a Muslim nation, “with a moderate Islam, and we will 
maintain that”.296 Abdeljalil warned against any extremist ideology that would attempt to 
hijack the movement; his statement was met with applause and celebration, the Libyan people 
clearly agreeing with his message.297  
 I have argued that the decision to intervene in Libya was fourfold. First, the situation 
in Libya threatened international security, a chief Canadian national interest; the NATO-led 
coalition had the potential of eradicating or mitigating this threat. Second, Canada felt 
compelled to intervene by a duty to NATO; as a middle power, Canada is bound by its 
commitments to multilateral institutions. Third, Canada’s economic interests in Libya 
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facilitated its decision to intervene. Finally, Canada faced no domestic pressure against the 
intervention.  
3. Explaining Canada’s Decision Not to Intervene in Syria 
I argue that Canada did not intervene in Syria because it did not have an opportunity nor 
an incentive to do so. There was no opportunity to intervene because paralysis at NATO and 
the UNSC hindered the creation of a multilateral military coalition, and as a middle power, 
Canada cannot intervene alone. 298 Had the opportunity for intervention presented itself 
however, it is unlikely that Canada would have intervened because it had no incentive to do 
so; its economic interests were not threatened, and it did not experience significant domestic 
pressure urging intervention.   
i. No Opportunity to Intervene 
I argue that Canada did not have an opportunity to intervene, because NATO refused 
to conduct a military intervention and the UN Security Council was deadlocked. As a middle 
power, Canada would not have intervened alone. 
NATO’s refusal to conduct a military intervention was due to the conflict’s inherent 
complexity. This complexity arose from concerns that, due to Iran’s involvement in the crisis 
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in support of al-Assad and to a lack of trust in the Syrian opposition, a military intervention in 
Syria would not be successful.  
NATO explicitly cited that the complexity of the crisis caused it to rule out intervention in 
Syria. On October 31, 2011, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that 
“NATO has no intention (to intervene) whatsoever. I can completely rule that out.”299 In 
February 2012, Rasmussen expanded on his statements, claiming that “Syria is ethnically, 
politically, religiously much more complicated than Libya. This is the reason why the right 
way forward is different.”300 The Secretary-General also stated that even if the mission was 
UN-mandated, it did not change the fact that it had little chances of success.301 Indeed, the 
complexity of the crisis in Syria was mainly due to Iran’s involvement in the crisis, and to the 
fragmented Syrian opposition.   
a. Iran, Syria, and the West 
Hostility towards Iran was somewhat alleviated in 2015, when Tehran signed the 
nuclear arms deal. However, I am interested in NATO’s assessment of the situation in the 
early years of the Syrian crisis; therefore, a description of Iran’s relationship with the West 
pre-nuclear arms deal is crucial to my analysis. 
 Iran’s involvement was disconcerting to many members of the West (including the 
EU, US, and Canada), which had long considered the country a threat to international peace 
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and security. Hostility towards Iran was notably due to Iran’s sponsoring of terrorist groups, 
its human rights record, and its nuclear ambitions.  
 Iran’s sponsoring of terrorist groups has caused many Western countries to consider 
Iran as a threat to international security. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas are part of the 
“Axis of Resistance”, an alliance which shares regional anti-West and anti-Israeli 
objectives.302 The partnership between Syria and Iran was borne out of Syrian isolation in the 
Middle East following three pivotal events: the death of Hafiz Al-Assad, the 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq, and the US’s “War on Terror” which targeted several Arab countries.303 In 
2006, Iran and Syria concretized this relationship by signing the Iranian-Syrian Supreme 
Defense Commission, the goal of which was to “provide a foundation for long-term military 
cooperation between the two countries to protect them from common threats, primarily the 
United States and Israel.”304 Further, Syria’s geographical position bordering Israel is 
practical for Iran, a “champion of anti-Israel activism.”305 Both Syria and Iran sponsor Hamas 
and Hezbollah; these are recognized terrorist groups by many Western powers, including the 
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European Union, Canada, and the US.306 Iran and Syria are also listed as state sponsors of 
terrorism in Canada,307 and the United-States.308   
 Iran’s abysmal human rights record also contributed many Western countries 
criticizing Tehran.309 Iran had been known to arbitrarily detain and torture citizens, restrict 
freedom of expression, restrict demonstrations, intimidate human rights activists, and kill 
protestors without cause.310  
The West was also critical of Iran due to its nuclear ambitions, though the nuclear 
arms deal of 2015 helped mitigate some of these concerns. Iran was long believed to be 
developing nuclear weapons; between 2005 and 2007, the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a US intelligence review, and the 
German intelligence service all claimed Iran would be able to produce a nuclear weapon by 
2015.311 Concerns about Iran acquiring nuclear power culminated in the Iranian arms deal, 
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signed in 2015, which would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.312 Part of the 
nuclear deal was to lift some international sanctions against Iran, though the US and Canada 
kept Iran on their list of states sponsoring terrorism.313 
Before 2015, concerns over Iran’s threats to international peace and security prompted 
the US, Canada, and EU to impose sanctions on Iran.314 Above the sanctions imposed on Iran, 
Canada and Germany in particular have been vocally critical of Iran. In 2009, Obama warned 
that Iran cannot “take its rightful place in the community of nations […] through terror or 
arms.”315 In 2014, the Government of Canada labelled Iran “the most significant threat to 
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global peace and security in the world today”.316 That same year, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel called Iran a threat “not just to Israel, but also to European countries.”317  
Tehran provided significant support to Al-Assad from the outset of the conflict, and had 
geopolitical reasons for doing so, as Tehran could not risk the rise of a Sunni-led regime 
backed by Gulf states to replace Al-Assad.318 As of April 2011, Iran was providing al-Assad’s 
forces with “weapons, surveillance equipment, and training,” as well as monitoring equipment 
to maintain surveillance on cell phones, social media, and e-mail accounts.319 In 2012, Iran 
increased its support by helping create the National Defence Forces (NDF), a paramilitary 
organisation of 100,000 soldiers mandated to help al-Assad’s forces.320 Iran also supplied al-
Assad with light arms, rocket launchers, rockets, Kalashnikov rifles, and drones to conduct 
strikes.321 Iran’s role in the crisis was well known; on June 16, 2011, the Canadian Foreign 
Affairs Minister stated that Iran was “assisting the al-Assad regime’s crackdown on the 
vulnerable people of Syria”.322  
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b. The Fragmented Syrian Opposition 
Some Western countries were also reticent to back the Syrian opposition, which was 
fragmented and included radical Islamist groups.  
 In contrast to the Libyan opposition, which was rather uniform and organized, the 
Syrian opposition was scattered and composed of groups with varying ideologies.323 Indeed, 
the West did not have the luxury of recognizing a sole governing authority of the Syrian 
people, as they had with the Libyan NTC. The Syrian opposition was both complex and 
included radical Islamist groups. At first, demonstrations seemed to make common demands: 
they requested political change, including system reform and, eventually, the downfall of the 
regime as a whole.324 This semblance of a united front did not last. Despite the overwhelming 
majority of rebels identifying as Sunni Muslims, the Syrian opposition was and continues to 
be extremely fractionalized.325 The fractionalization of the Syrian opposition sent inconsistent 
messages to the population of Syria and to foreign powers. Attempts were made throughout 
the war to unify the opposition front. In September 2011, an umbrella organization called the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) was founded, which included members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, liberals, Salafists and Kurds.326  The SNC did not succeed in unifying the 
opposition. This was due to three main issues. First, the Muslim Brotherhood held about 25% 
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of the council’s seats, and some critics argued this gave them far too much decision-making 
power over the SNC’s policies; there were concerns over Islamist domination of the 
council.327 Second, Kurdish members of the council believed their desire for political 
decentralization went unheeded, accusing the SNC of bending to pressure from the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Turkey.328 Eventually, the Kurdish faction of the SNC broke off from the 
council to form their own committee. Lastly, disagreement arose regarding the appropriate 
response to the regime’s increasing use of violence.329 This disagreement seemed to be 
resolved in March 2012, when the SNC announced that it was creating a bureau to facilitate 
coordination between the SNC and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in order to distribute arms 
sourced by foreign powers; this, however, did not lead to a more effective relationship.330 
Some other opposition factions (such as the National Coordination Body for Democratic 
Change) did not agree with the SNC’s more aggressive strategy towards the regime.331 The 
SNC did not succeed in unifying the opposition, which remained fragmented, ever-changing, 
and extremely complex.   
Most Western countries, including the EU and US, recognized the Syrian National 
Council (SNC) as the only representative of the Syrian people, but the SNC did not succeed in 
unifying the opposition.332 The West remained concerned with the existence of radical 
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Islamist groups in the opposition;333 Harper was notably concerned with the complexity of the 
opposition. Standing before the UK Parliament in 2013, Harper described the “grotesque 
dilemma” in Syria.334 The dilemma was caused by, on one hand, a desire to halt the violent 
actions of Al-Assad’s government against the Syrian people and, on the other hand, a 
reticence to attempt to help an extremist and sectarian opposition.335  
c. Deadlock at the UN Security Council 
The UNSC was deadlocked due to Russian and Chinese vetoes. These vetoes were 
motivated by, first, Russia and China’s long-standing opposition to violations of territorial 
sovereignty. These concerns were aggravated following the UN-mandated NATO-led 
coalition in Libya, which began as a humanitarian intervention and turned into an effort at 
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regime change. Russia’s vetoes were also motivated by its ties to Syria, which prompted 
Russia to refuse any resolution which placed strong blame on al-Assad’s government.  
The main reason that a UNSC Resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria did not 
occur is due to Russia and China’s vetoes.336 On October 4, 2011 and February 4, 2012 
(respectively) the Russian Federation and China vetoed two resolutions regarding Syria; these 
were S/2011/612 and S/2012/77.337 Defending their position in their rejection of draft 
resolution S/2011/612, which would have condemned the actions of the Syrian government 
and called for a Syrian-led peace process, the Russian Federation, supported by China, cited 
“the logic of respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the 
principle of non-intervention.”338 They added a feeling of acute discomfort with the 
“accusatory bent” towards Damascus.339 They did not explicitly claim support for the Al-
Assad regime, instead shifting the attention towards the actions of the “radical opposition” 
who they believed no longer hid their extremist bent.340 The second time the Russian 
Federation and China vetoed a resolution regarding Syria, they expanded on their reasons. 
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The Russian Federation cited that its rejection of draft resolution S/2012/77 was notably due 
to the language used, which seemed to insist on regime change.341 A resolution, UNSC 2042, 
was finally unanimously adopted by the Security Council on April 14, 2011; this resolution 
authorized the deployment of an advance team to monitor the ceasefire in Syria and requested 
that al-Assad pull back his military and heavy weapons from population centres.342 On July 
19, 2012, draft resolution S/2012/538 was vetoed by China and Russia.343 This resolution 
would have subjected al-Assad’s government to article 41 of the UN Charter, which would 
entail “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”.344 China stated the resolution blamed only al-Assad in the conflict, and no other 
party, while Russia claimed that the Security Council members were trying to further their 
own “geopolitical designs” with their involvement in the conflict..345  
Russia and China’s vetoes at the UNSC were partly motivated by their resistance against 
violations of a state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. China and Russia often vote as a 
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bloc on sovereignty issues at the UNSC.346 This is mainly due to fears of US expansion in the 
international system and of Western values gaining a dominant position.347 Primary concerns 
by Russia and China at the UNSC are that the Western states will use humanitarian 
intervention as a pretext to reshape the political landscape of the target states in their 
interests.348  
These concerns over sovereignty in Syria were made more acute following the NATO-led 
coalition in Libya, which had changed scope throughout the operation. What had begun as a 
mission to protect civilians had turned into one aimed at Gaddafi’s removal. Russia had 
agreed to UNSC 1973, which called for “all measures necessary” to protect the Libyan people 
from the government’s use of force.349 However, the operation changed scope; by June 2011, 
the mission became geared towards removing Gaddafi, which it successfully did in October 
2011.350 Russia was vocal about its frustration with this change, accusing NATO member 
states in July 2011 of “expanding” the Libya resolution to include regime change in an effort 
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to suit its ends.351 In its rejection of draft resolution S/2012/77 (which would have condemned 
al-Assad’s regime for its human rights violations and required the government to withdraw 
the military from cities and towns), Russia claimed its veto was motivated by “some 
influential members of the international community, including some sitting at this table, 
[which] have undermined any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime change, 
encouraging the opposition towards power.”352  
 Russia was also motivated to use its veto due to its relations with the Syrian 
government, which are largely based on Russia’s military and economic interests in Syria. 
Notably, Russia holds the rights to use Tartus, a military port in Syria.353 Further, the Kremlin 
has a vested interest in maintaining ties with Syria, through which it could eventually run 
pipelines thus compensating for the fact that Russian pipelines currently run through states no 
longer under Russian control.354 Syria’s interest in maintaining this partnership is largely 
based on the obvious political advantage of having such a powerful ally to back its regime, 
plus an economic advantage; in 2005, Al-Assad had three-quarters of his arms sales debt to 
Russia written off.355 Despite causing stalemates at the UNSC in defense of al-Assad’s 
government, Russia did not directly assist al-Assad’s government in responding to opposition 
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early in the conflict. Russian military involvement in the Syrian crisis began in 2015, when it 
launched air strikes against ISIL.356 It is believed, however, that Russia also attacks other anti-
Assad rebels in an effort to keep al-Assad in power.357  
ii. No Incentive to Intervene 
I argue that even if Canada was provided with the opportunity to intervene in Syria, it 
lacked an incentive to do so. Canada had no economic interests in Syria, and experienced no 
domestic pressure urging a military intervention.  
 Canada’s economic prosperity was not threatened in Syria. Imports from Syria and 
exports to Syria are not exceptionally important.358 Between 2000 and 2011, Syria imported 
an annual average of $45M worth of Canadian products, ranging from machinery to textile 
fabrics.359 However, Canada has no important business interests in Syria particularly; 
certainly, business interests are much weaker than those Canada holds in Libya.360 Although 
some experts have argued that Syria could be geopolitically attractive as it could allow access 
to Middle East oil, Canada had not yet capitalized on this opportunity.361  
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 The Canadian government experienced no pro-intervention pressure by its electorate 
or in Parliament. The Syrian diaspora in Canada is small, approximately 0.1% of the total 
population,362 and it did not make any vocal pleas with the government to intervene. Further, 
debates in Parliament would suggest that blame was placed on the United Nations, not the 
Canadian government, for lack of military action in Syria. Blame was placed on the United 
Nations for the stalemate, more particularly caused by Russian and China vetoes; on June 14, 
2011, Liberal MP Bob Rae expressed frustration with Russia and China, claiming they “do 
not want an intervention because they do not want the eyes of the world to be focusing on 
them”.363 During that same debate, Green Party leader Elizabeth May agreed that Russia and 
China were causing a stalemate, but she was critical of the government’s mission in Libya; 
she had been the only MP to vote against an extension of the mission in Libya. Indeed, May 
blamed the Syria stalemate on the mission in Libya, stating that since it had changed goals 
towards regime change, Canada had lost support of Russia and China by fear the same would 
occur in Syria.364  
 Canada did not intervene in Syria because it did not have the opportunity to do so; this 
was due to paralysis at the UNSC and NATO. For its part, NATO rejected the possibility of a 
Syrian intervention on the grounds that it was far too complex. This complexity was due, first, 
to Iran’s involvement in the crisis; to the West, Iran a known disruptor of peace and 
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international security, and it backed al-Assad’s regime with intelligence, arms, and military 
personnel. The complexity of the crisis was also due to the fragmented opposition, which 
failed at creating a unified front against al-Assad, and included extremist groups. Paralysis at 
the UNSC was caused by Russia, who vetoed several resolutions regarding Syria. At the UN 
Security Council, members had difficulty agreeing on the proper way to manage the crisis; 
Russia’s vetoes were due to its support of al-Assad’s regime, and to its distrust in the West 
after NATO had changed the scope of the Libya intervention to topple the regime. Even if 
Canada had been given the opportunity to participate in a military intervention, it was unlikely 
to do so because it had no economic interests in Syria and did not experience domestic 
pressure urging an intervention.   
VIII. Conclusion 
The uprisings in Libya and Syria held some important similarities: they belonged to the 
wider movement of the Arab Spring, occurred within a similar time frame, and were a 
response to corrupt regimes and political repression. However, Canada’s response was 
different in both states: where Canada actively participated in a multilateral coalition which 
culminated in the toppling of Gaddafi’s regime, it “sat on its hands” in Syria and did not take 
concrete action either in support of or against the Al-Assad government.  
I have argued that Canada’s response in Libya can be explained by four main factors. 
First, Libya indirectly threatened Canada’s national interest in international stability, and a 
NATO coalition could help mitigate this threat. Second, Canada’s position as a middle power 
meant it felt a responsibility towards NATO and the United Nations to participate in the 
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coalition; indeed, the Minister of Defence qualified Canada’s participation as a “duty” to both 
organizations.365 I also argued that Canada was also motivated by direct threats to its 
economic prosperity; Canada held significant oil interests in Libya at the time of the 
intervention, and these were threatened by the conflict. Last, Canada faced no domestic 
pressure against the intervention; there was cross-party support for both the mission and its 
extension three months later. I have also added that due to Libya’s geographic isolation, lack 
of allies, weak military, and organized opposition, the decision for Canada to intervene was 
facilitated.  
In contrast, I have argued that Canada’s lack of intervention in Syria can be explained by 
the fact that it had no opportunity nor any incentive to do so. First, paralysis at NATO and the 
UNSC hindered the creation of a multilateral military coalition in Syria. Paralysis at NATO 
was caused by the belief that the situation in Syria was too complex and that a military 
intervention would not succeed. The complexity of the crisis was due to Iran actively and 
unequivocally backing al-Assad in the crisis, and to the fragmented opposition which included 
extremist groups. Paralysis at the UNSC was caused by Russia and China’s vetoes on UNSC 
Resolutions; these vetoes were motivated by Russia and China’s mistrust in the West 
following the intervention in Libya. The intervention, which had begun as an operation to 
protect Libyan citizens from violence, turned into one aimed at regime change.  
                                                 





My research asked why Canada intervened in Libya, and not in Syria, despite the 
seemingly similar dynamics of both conflicts and the fact that they occurred simultaneously. 
In order to identify the factors which led to Canada’s decisions, I used NCR theory, which 
claims that states will conduct military interventions in response to threats to their national 
interests; these interventions will be subjected to domestic pressure which may affect the 
timing and implementation of these interventions.  
Both case studies confirm the main tenets of NCR theory. In Syria, Canada did not 
intervene; its interests were not threatened and it did not experience domestic pressure urging 
an intervention. In contrast, the crisis in Libya caused an indirect threat to Canada’s interest in 
international stability, and a direct threat to Canada’s economic interests. Moreover, there was 
no domestic pressure against the intervention. However, I have also argued that some other 
considerations, which fall outside the purview of NCR theory, may have impacted the 
government’s decision to intervene in Libya. This raises questions about NCR’s ability to 
comprehensively define the reasons why states intervene. Other considerations may impact a 
state’s decision to conduct a military intervention, such as the context of the intervention, its 
level of potential risk, the response by its allies, and the nature of the groups in the conflict.  
In the case studies analyzed, it seems that in many ways, Canada’s loyalty and 
commitment to NATO and its allies weighed more heavily in the decisions to intervene or 
not. Although its interests were threatened in Libya, Canada could not have intervened alone. 
In Syria, had Canada’s interests been threatened, a deadlock at NATO meant that Canada 
would not have been able to consider intervention. Therefore, it is possible that the short-
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comings of NCR theory could be due to its lack of applicability to middle powers. This opens 
up new avenues of research, namely which considerations – outside threats to its national 
interests and the constraint caused by domestic pressure – exist for middle powers to conduct 




“A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power.” E-International Relations, December 4, 
2015. http://www.e-ir.info/2015/12/04/a-critical-review-of-the-concept-of-middle-power/. 
“A New Doctrine for New Wars.” Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2001. 
Abadi, Jacob. “Pragmatism and Rhetoric in Libya’s Policy Toward Israel.” Journal of Conflict 
Studies 20, no. 2 (August 8, 2000). 
https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4313. 
Abboud, Samer. “How Syria Fell to Pieces.” Current History 114, no. 776 (December 2015): 337–
42. 
Abdo, Geneive. “How Iran Keeps Assad in Power in Syria.” Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2011. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2011-08-25/how-iran-keeps-assad-power-syria. 
Abouzeid, Rania. “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire.” Time, January 21, 
2011. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html. 
Adonis, Philippe Sergeant, and Ali Ibrahim. Printemps arabes - Religion et Révolution. Paris: La 
Différence, 2014. 
AFP. “Canada to Lift Sanctions against Iran, Foreign Affairs Minister Says.” The Guardian, 
January 26, 2016, sec. World news. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/26/canada-
lift-sanctions-iran. 
Afrol News. “Djibouti Protesters Keep up the Pressure.” Accessed July 29, 2017. 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/37368. 
———. “Mass Arrests Stopped Further Djibouti Protests.” Accessed July 29, 2017. 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/37449. 
Aghayev, Elvin. “Analysis and Background of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya.” European Researcher. 
Accessed August 8, 2017. 
https://www.academia.edu/3492822/Analysis_and_background_of_the_Arab_Spring_in_Liby
a. 
Ahmed, Nafeez. “Iraq Invasion Was about Oil | Nafeez Ahmed.” The Guardian, March 20, 2014, 
sec. Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/20/iraq-
war-oil-resources-energy-peak-scarcity-economy. 
———. “Syria Intervention Plans Fuelled by Oil Interests, Not Chemical Weapon Concerns | 
Nafeez Ahmed.” The Guardian, August 30, 2013, sec. Environment. 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-
war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines. 
Akin, David. “Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Speech to the UK Parliament.” David Akin’s On 




Al Jazeera. “Djiboutians Rally to Oust President - Al Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera, February 18, 
2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121816513686216.html. 
———. “Russia Carries out First Air Strikes in Syria.” Al Jazeera, September 30, 2015. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/russian-carries-air-strikes-syria-
150930133155190.html. 
“Al Qaeda Is Starting to Swallow the Syrian Opposition.” Foreign Policy. Accessed August 19, 
2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/15/al-qaeda-is-swallowing-the-syrian-opposition/. 
Alexander, Harriet. “UN Security Council Unanimously Approves ‘All Necessary Measures’ 
against Isil in Syria,” November 21, 2015, sec. World. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12009275/UN-Security-Council-
unanimously-approves-all-necessary-measures-against-Isil-in-Syria.html. 
Alexander, John. “Canada’s Commitment to NATO: Are We Pulling Our Weight?” Canadian 
Military Journal 15, no. 4 (Autumn 2015): 1–11. 
Allin, Dana H., and Steven Simon. “The Moral Psychology of US Support for Israel.” Survival 45, 
no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 123–44. doi:10.1080/00396330312331343426. 
Al–Qadhafi, Saif Aleslam. “Libyan–American Relations.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 1 (March 1, 
2003): 35–44. doi:10.1111/1475-4967.00093. 
Amnesty International. “THE BATTLE FOR LIBYA: Killings, Disappearances, and Torture.” 
Amnesty International, September 13, 2011. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=MDE19%2f025%2f2011&
language=en. 
“An Overview of the Lumber Industry in Canada, 2004 to 2010.” Statistics Canada. Accessed 
August 17, 2017. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-621-m/2011089/part-partie1-eng.htm. 
Apps, Peter, and William Maclean. “Factbox: Libya’s Military: What Does Gaddafi Have Left?” 
Reuters. March 1, 2011, sec. WORLD NEWS. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-
military-idUSTRE72027E20110301. 
Associated Press. “Massive Show of Force Quashes Saudi Arabia Protests.” Associated Press, 
March 11, 2011. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/11/police-flood-saudi-capital-
ahead-planned-protests.html. 
Axelrod, Robert, ed. Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2015. 
Bahgat, Gawdat. “United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge.” Parameters 38, no. 
4 (Winter  -2009 2008): 95–108. 
Barnes, Jessica. “Managing the Waters of Ba ՙth Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria.” 
Geopolitics 14, no. 3 (August 21, 2009): 510–30. doi:10.1080/14650040802694117. 
Basaran, Halil Rahman. “Identifying the Responsibility to Protect.” Fletcher Forum of World 
Affairs 38 (2014): 195–212. 
96 
 
Baum, Matthew A. “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation 
Restore Hope.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 187–226. 
doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2007.00236.x-i1. 
BBC News. “Saudi Arabia Prepares for ‘Day of Rage’ Protests.” BBC News, March 10, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-12708487/saudi-arabia-prepares-for-day-of-
rage-protests. 
Beaumont, Peter, and Chris Stephen. “Gaddafi’s Last Words as He Begged for Mercy: ‘What Did I 
Do to You?’” The Observer, October 22, 2011, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/23/gaddafi-last-words-begged-mercy. 
Bellamy, Alex J. “Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International 
Society.” Review of International Studies 29, no. 3 (July 2003): 321–40. 
doi:10.1017/S0260210503003218. 
Bellamy, Alex J. “The Responsibility to Protect: Added Value or Hot Air?” Cooperation and 
Conflict 48, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 333–57. doi:10.1177/0010836713482448. 
Bentley, Michelle. “The Intervention Taboo(s): Strategy and Normative Invalidation.” Review of 
International Studies 43, no. 3 (July 2017): 557–80. doi:10.1017/S026021051700002X. 
Biddle, Stephen. “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (2003): 31–
46. doi:10.2307/20033502. 
Biddle, Stephen D. “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.” International Security 30, no. 3 (2005): 161–76. doi:10.2307/4137490. 
Bishop, Patrick. “Assad Releases Damascus Spring Rebels,” January 19, 2006, sec. World. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/1508251/Assad-releases-
Damascus-Spring-rebels.html. 
Bix, Herbert P. “The North African—Middle East Uprisings from Tunisia to Libya.” The 
Massachusetts Review 52, no. 2 (2011): 329–47. doi:10.2307/23209929. 
Black, David R., and Paul D. Williams. The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of 
Darfur. Routledge, 2010. 
Black, Ian. “Democracy Damascus Style: Assad the Only Choice in Referendum.” The Guardian, 
May 28, 2007, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/28/syria.ianblack. 
Blomdahl, Mikael. “Diversionary Theory of War and the Case Study Design: President Clinton’s 
Strikes on Iraq and Yugoslavia.” Armed Forces & Society 43, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 545–65. 
doi:10.1177/0095327X16651866. 
Boaduo, Nana Adu-Pipim. “Invasion of Iraq: Introspective Analysis of US Long Term Foreign 
Policy in the Middle East.” Journal of Political Studies 19, no. 2 (2012): 87–96. 




Boettcher, William A. “Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing 
Induced Risk Behavior.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (2004): 331–55. 
Bonham, G. Matthew. “Cognitive Mapping as a Technique for Supporting International 
Negotiation.” Theory and Decision 34, no. 3 (May 1, 1993): 255–73. 
doi:10.1007/BF01075192. 
Bonham, G. Matthew, Michael J. Shapiro, and George J. Nozicka. “A Cognitive Process Model of 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” Simulation & Games 7, no. 2. Accessed April 21, 2017. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232602085_A_Cognitive_Process_Model_of_Forei
gn_Policy_Decision-Making. 
Borshchevskaya, Anna. “Sponsored Corruption and Neglected Reform in Syria.” Middle East 
Quarterly, June 1, 2010. http://www.meforum.org/2760/syria-corruption-reform. 
Boulden, Jane. “Syria and the Responsibility to Protect.” In Elusive Pursuits: Lessons From 
Canada’s Interventions Abroad, 2015th ed., 181–98. Canada Among Nations. Waterloo, ON: 
Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2015. 
Boyle, Michael J. “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy. Edited by Peter L. 
Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg; Drone Theory. By Grégoire Chamayou.” International 
Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 210–11. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12521. 
———. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 
1, 2013): 1–29. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12002. 
Brahimi, Alia. “Libya’s Revolution.” The Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 4 (December 1, 
2011): 605–24. doi:10.1080/13629387.2011.630880. 
Brown, Michael. “Canadian Companies in the Libyan Energy Sector.” Leadership and Democracy 
Lab. Western Social Science. Accessed August 16, 2017. 
http://www.democracylab.uwo.ca/research/current_research/oil_and_energy_in_libya/canadia
n_companies_in_the_libyan_energy_sector.html. 
Brynen, Rex, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joëlle Zahar. Beyond the Arab 
Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2012. 
Bryson, Rachael, Katie Domansky, and Rebecca Jensen. “Canada in Libya: Strategic Lessons 
Learned.” Centre for Military and Strategic Studies: National Defence, November 2012. 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/rddc-drdc/D68-3-271-2012-eng.pdf. 
Büchs, Annette. “The Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in Syria under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad.” 
German Institute of Global and Area Studies: Working Papers. GIGA Research Progamme: 
Institute of Middle East Studies, March 2009. https://www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp97_buechs.pdf. 
Buckley, Caitlin. “Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria.” Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 2 
(July 1, 2012). doi:<p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.5</p>. 
98 
 
Bugra Kanat, Kilic. “Leadership Style And Diversionary Theory Of Foreign Policy: The Use Of 
Diversionary Strategies By Middle Eastern Leaders During And In The Immediate Aftermath 
Of The Gulf War.” Dissertation, Syracuse University, 2011. 
http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=psc_etd. 
Bulatov, Col O. G., Lt Col Yu V. Klemin, and Lt Col V. G. Stradin. “Effectiveness of Geophysical 
Conditions on Military Operations.” Military Thought 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 123–29. 
Bull, Hedley, Andrew Hurrell, and Stanley Hoffman. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics. 4 edition. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
Bush White House. “President Delivers State of the Union Address.” Bush White House, January 
29, 2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-
11.html. 
———. “U.S. - Canada Smart Border/30 Point Action Plan Update,” December 6, 2002. 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206-1.html. 
Butler, Michael J. “Just Causes or False Premises?  Just War Theory and Western Military 
Intervention, 1945--1995.” Doctoral Dissertations, January 1, 2004, 1–370. 
Byman, Daniel. “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 31, no. 3 (February 22, 2008): 169–81. doi:10.1080/10576100701878424. 
Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada;Government of. “Agriculture and Food Market 
Intelligence by Market - Middle East and Africa.” Resource list, March 18, 2016. 
http://www.agr.gc.ca/eng/industry-markets-and-trade/foreign-market-information-by-
region/middle-east-and-africa/market-intelligence/by-market/?id=1458155921428#Bahrain. 
“Canada and Iran: Canada’s Direct Diplomacy.” Government of Canada, March 2014. 
www.canadainternational.gc.ca/Iran/canada-iran/direct_diplomacy-
diplomatie_directe.aspx?lang=eng. 
“Canada ‘deeply Skeptical’ of Iran Nuclear Deal.” CBC News. Accessed August 17, 2017. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-nuclear-deal-gets-deeply-skeptical-response-from-canada-
1.2438467. 
Canada, Global Affairs. “Minister Cannon to Speak to UN Human Rights Council and Conference 
on Disarmament.” News releases, February 27, 2011. 
https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2011/02/minister-cannon-speak-human-rights-
council-conference-disarmament.html. 
“Canada Recognizes Legitimacy of Libyan Rebel Council.” National Post. Accessed April 9, 
2017. http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-recognizes-libyan-rebel-council-as-
new-government. 
“Canada Will Fight To Protect Libyan Civilians: Harper.” CTV News, March 19, 2011. 
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20110319/harper-leader-talk-gadhafi-paris-110319/. 
Caradan International Chemicals. “Caradan International: Our Locations | Libya.” Accessed 
August 17, 2017. http://www.caradaninternational.com/index-4.html. 
99 
 
Carnegie Middle East Centre. “The Damascus Declaration.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48514?lang=en. 
———. “The Damascus Spring.” Carneige Middle East Centre. Accessed August 15, 2017. 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48516?lang=en. 
Carrell, Severin, and Scotland correspondent. “Lockerbie Bomber Returns to Hero’s Welcome in 
Libya.” The Guardian, August 21, 2009, sec. UK news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/aug/21/lockerbie-megrahi-libya-return. 
CBC News. “A Timeline of Canada’s Anti-ISIS Fight.” CBC News, February 8, 2016. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/timeline-fight-isis-chronology-1.3438858. 
———. “Canada Announces Sanctions against Syria.” CBC News, May 24, 2011. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-announces-sanctions-against-syria-1.1122913. 
———. “Canada’s Mission in Libya Extended.” CBC News, June 14, 2011. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-s-mission-in-libya-extended-1.988569. 
———. “Canadian Companies in Libya.” CBC News, February 28, 2011. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-companies-in-libya-1.1058943. 
———. “Canadian Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Bombers in Arctic.” CBC News, September 19, 
2014. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-fighter-jets-intercept-russian-bombers-in-
arctic-1.2772440. 
———. “CBC Investigation: Who Killed Lebanon’s Rafik Hariri?” CBC News, November 21, 
2010. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/cbc-investigation-who-killed-lebanon-s-rafik-hariri-
1.874820. 
———. “CBC News In Depth: Canada’s Military,” October 30, 2003. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/cdnmilitary/kosovo.html. 
———. “Commons Approves Libyan Mission by UN.” CBC News, March 21, 2011. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/commons-approves-libyan-mission-by-un-1.1003651. 
———. “McCain Defends Napolitano, Insists 9/11 Perpetrators Came from Canada.” CBC News, 
April 24, 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/mccain-defends-napolitano-insists-9-11-
perpetrators-came-from-canada-1.830149. 
CBS News. “Saudi Police Thwart Capital City Protests.” CBS News. Accessed July 29, 2017. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-police-thwart-capital-city-protests/. 
Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace and Acts of Agression (2014). 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140825052140/http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapt
er7.shtml. 
Chew, Allen F. “Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies.” Lavenworth Papers. Fort 




Chipman, John. “Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes - A Net Assessment - Press Statement.” 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2005. 
https://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archi
ve/2005-cbbd/september-4051/iran-strategic-sd-press-statement-415d. 
Christensen, Thomas J. Useful Adversaries. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance 
Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–68. 
doi:10.2307/2706792. 
CLARK, CAMPBELL. “Too Risky to Fund Syrian Rebels, Canada Says,” February 28, 2013, sec. 
news. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/too-risky-to-fund-syrian-rebels-canada-
says/article9200605/. 
Clark, John F. “A Constructivist Account of the Congo Wars.” African Security 4, no. 3 (July 1, 
2011): 147–70. doi:10.1080/19392206.2011.599262. 
CNN. “Activists: Hundreds Protest in Hofuf, Qatif on Saudi ‘Day of Rage.’” Accessed July 29, 
2017. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/11/saudi.arabia.protests/index.html. 
———. “Protesters Rally against Government in Djibouti,” February 18, 2011. 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/18/djibouti.protest/index.html. 
Cohen, Tobi. “Canadian Warship En Route, JTF2 Sent to Libya.” Ottawa Citizen. March 2, 2011. 
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Canadian+warship+route+JTF2+sent+Libya/4369428/sto
ry.html. 
Coll, Steve. “The Casbah Coalition.” The New Yorker, March 28, 2011. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/04/the-casbah-coalition. 
———. “The Syrian Problem.” The New Yorker, May 23, 2011. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/30/the-syrian-problem. 
Collier, David. “The Comparative Method.” In Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, 
edited by Ada W. Finifter, Second., 994. W W Norton & Co, 2003. 
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3827/APSA-
TheComparativeMethod.pdf. 
Comment, Full. “Stephen Harper Says Canada Prepared to Attack ISIS in Syria, but Not Assad 
Regime.” National Post, November 14, 2014. http://nationalpost.com/opinion/stephen-harper-
says-canada-prepared-to-attack-isis-in-syria-but-not-assad-regime/wcm/82f27a75-7d94-4791-
9826-ed9e66c35c63. 
Commins, David, and David W. Lesch. Historical Dictionary of Syria. Scarecrow Press, 2013. 
Cooper, David A. “Somewhere Between Great and Small: Disentangling the Conceptual Jumble of 
Middle, Regional, and ‘Niche’ Powers.” The Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations, Summer 2013, 23–35. 
Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Changing Military Balance In the Gulf.” Middle East Policy 6, no. 1 
(June 1, 1998): 25–44. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.1998.tb00292.x. 
101 
 
COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/154 (2017). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0154&from=EN. 
Cowell, Alan, and Steven Erlanger. “France Becomes First Country to Recognize Libyan Rebels.” 
The New York Times, March 10, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/europe/11france.html. 
Coyne, Christopher J., and Steve Davies. “Nineteen Public Bads of Empire, Nation Building, and 
the Like.” Independent Review 12, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 129–32. 
Crane, David. “Canada–US Economic Relations.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed April 24, 
2017. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/economic-canadian-american-
relations/. 
Creswell, Michael, and Marc Trachtenberg. “France and the German Question, 1945-1955.” 
Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 5–28. 
CTV News. “A Look at Key Events in Syria since March 2011 | CTV News,” March 15, 2016. 
http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/a-look-at-key-events-in-syria-since-march-2011-1.2817727. 
Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention.” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 2–7. doi:10.2307/23217215. 
Dam, Nikolaos van. The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the 
Ba’th Party. Revised edition. London: I.B.Tauris, 2011. 
David, Charles-Philippe, and Stéphane Roussel. “‘Middle Power Blues’: Canadian Policy and 
International Security after the Cold War.” American Review of Canadian Studies 28, no. 1–2 
(June 1, 1998): 131–56. doi:10.1080/02722019809481566. 
De Waal, Alex. “Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect.” International Affairs 83, 
no. 6 (November 1, 2007): 1039–54. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00672.x. 
“Denmark to Expand Military Mission against Islamic State into Syria.” Reuters, March 4, 2016. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-denmark-idUSKCN0W611S. 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development. “Canada Lists Both Iran and Syria as 
State Supporters of Terrorism,” September 7, 2012. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/09/07c.aspx? lang¼eng. 
———. “Canada Targets Al-Assad Supporters as Violence Continues.” August 31, 2012. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/08/31b.aspx?lang¼eng. 
Dewar, Rob. Foreign Affairs Committee (2011). https://openparliament.ca/committees/foreign-
affairs/41-1/1/paul-dewar-23/. 
Deyermond, Ruth. “The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty-First Century Russian Foreign Policy.” 
Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 6 (July 2, 2016): 957–84. doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1204985. 




Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, 
no. 3 (1983): 205–35. 
“Draft Resolution S/PV.6711: Meeting Record.” United Nations Security Council. Accessed 
August 19, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6711. 
“Drums of War: Israel and the ‘Axis of Resistance.’” Middle East Report. International Crisis 




Drury, A. Cooper, L. Marvin Overby, Adrian Ang, and Yitan Li. “‘Pretty Prudent’ or Rhetorically 
Responsive? The American Public’s Support for Military Action.” Political Research 
Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2010): 83–96. doi:10.2307/27759888. 
Dueck, Colin. “Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and 
Major Military Interventions.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 139–
69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Ekmekci, Faruk. “Terrorism as War by Other Means: National Security and State Support for 
Terrorism.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 54, no. 1 (2011): 125–41. 
doi:10.1590/S0034-73292011000100008. 
“Elizabeth May, ‘Libya’ on June 14th, 2011 | Openparliament.ca.” Accessed July 21, 2017. 
https://openparliament.ca/debates/2011/6/14/elizabeth-may-3/. 
Encarnación, Omar G. “The Follies of Democratic Imperialism.” World Policy Journal 22, no. 1 
(2005): 47–60. doi:10.2307/40209949. 
Encyclopedia Britannica. “Libya Revolt of 2011.” Accessed August 8, 2017. 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011. 
Erlanger, Steven. “Action on Libya, Driven by France and Britain, Shows Rare European 
Resolve.” The New York Times, March 18, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19europe.html. 
Essoo, Gaelle, and Aline Schmidt. “Two Years after Iran Nuclear Deal, a Mixed Picture.” France 
24, July 17, 2017. http://www.france24.com/en/20170717-focus-iran-two-years-nuclear-deal-
business-trade-investors-investment-us-sanctions-total. 
“EU Follows Italy’s Move to Recognize Syrian Opposition Coalition.” RT International. Accessed 
August 19, 2017. https://www.rt.com/news/syria-opposition-eu-representative-099/. 
“EU Prolongs Sanctions on Iran Over Human Rights Violations.” US News & World Report. 
Accessed August 19, 2017. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-04-11/eu-
prolongs-sanctions-on-iran-over-human-rights-violations. 
Evans, Michael. “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War.” Naval War 
College Review 56, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 132–50. 
103 
 
Evera, Stephen Van. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. 1 edition. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001. 
Evera, Stephen van. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.” International Security 22, no. 4 
(1998): 5–43. doi:10.2307/2539239. 
Fearon, James D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” The 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92. doi:10.2307/2944796. 
Filipovic, Jovan, Srečko Srečko Devjak, and Bogomil Ferfila. “Diaspora Engagement Strategies 
and Policies.” International Public Administration Review 10, no. 2 (April 24, 2014). 
http://uprava.fu.uni-lj.si/index.php/IPAR/article/view/215. 
Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society. 1 edition. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 1996. 
Fitzsimmons, Scott, Allan Craigie, and Marc André Bodet. “Canadian Public Opinion about the 
Military: Assessing the Influences on Attitudes toward Defence Spending and Participation in 
Overseas Combat Operations.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de 
Science Politique 47, no. 3 (September 2014): 503–18. doi:10.1017/S0008423914000754. 
“Foreign Affairs Committee on April 15th, 2010 | Openparliament.ca.” Accessed August 18, 2017. 
https://openparliament.ca/committees/foreign-affairs/40-3/10/jim-abbott-5/. 
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” US Department of State. Accessed August 18, 2017. 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
“France Recognises Syria Opposition Coalition - Al Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera, November 14, 
2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121113174633204988.html. 
“Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight the Syrian Army.” Syria Comment, July 
30, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/free-syrian-army-established-to-fight-the-syrian-
army/. 
Friedman, Uri. “Rami Makhlouf: The Man the Syrian Regime Is Distancing Itself From.” The 
Atlantic, May 12, 2011. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/rami-
makhlouf-man-syrian-regime-distancing-itself/350612/. 
Frontier Centre for Public Policy. “The Economic Blunders Behind the Arab Revolutions: In Egypt 
and Syria, Misguided Food and Water Policies Set the Stage for Revolt and Civil War.,” July 
24, 2013. http://archive.fcpp.org/posts/the-economic-blunders-behind-the-arab-revolutions-in-
egypt-and-syria-misguided-food-and-water-policies-set-the-stage-for-revolt-and-civil-war. 
Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. “Iranian Strategy in Syria.” Institute for the Study of 
War, May 2013. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-
1MAY.pdf. 





Gaub, Florence. “The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression.” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 221–44. doi:10.1080/01402390.2012.742010. 
Gelvin, James L., and Mark Moseley. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. MP3 
Una edition. Audible Studios on Brilliance Audio, 2016. 
Gent, Stephen E. “Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the 
Diversionary Theory of War.” International Interactions 35, no. 1 (March 17, 2009): 1–29. 
doi:10.1080/03050620802497048. 
Gholiagha, Sassan. “‘To Prevent Future Kosovos and Future Rwandas.’ A Critical Constructivist 
View of the Responsibility to Protect.” The International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 8 
(November 17, 2015): 1074–97. doi:10.1080/13642987.2015.1082848. 
Gilley, Bruce. “Did Bush Democratize the Middle East? The Effects of External–Internal 
Linkages.” Political Science Quarterly 128, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 653–85. 
doi:10.1002/polq.12141. 
———. “Middle Powers during Great Power Transitions: China’s Rise and the Future of Canada-
US Relations.” International Journal 66, no. 2 (2011): 245–64. doi:10.2307/27976092. 
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Revised ed. edition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. 
Glanville, Luke. “Does R2P Matter? Interpreting the Impact of a Norm.” Cooperation and Conflict 
51, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 184–99. doi:10.1177/0010836715612850. 
Glaser, Charles L. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security 19, no. 
3 (1994): 50–90. doi:10.2307/2539079. 
Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann. “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We 
Measure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82. doi:10.2307/2539240. 
Global News. “Donald Trump Lectures Canada, Other NATO Members to up Defence Spending - 
National | Globalnews.ca,” May 25, 2017. http://globalnews.ca/news/3477993/donald-trump-
nato-defence-spending/. 
Godefroy, Andrew. “Canada’s International Policy Statement Five Years Later.” Canadian 
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2010. 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413662062/Can
adas_International_Policy_Statement_Five_Years_Later.pdf?1413662062. 
Goldsmith, Benjamin E., Yusaku Horiuchi, and Takashi Inoguchi. “American Foreign Policy and 
Global Opinion: Who Supported the War in Afghanistan?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49, no. 3 (2005): 408–29. doi:10.2307/30045121. 
Goldstone, Jack A. “Cross-Class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011.” Swiss 
Political Science Review 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 457–62. doi:10.1111/j.1662-
6370.2011.02038.x. 
Gordon, Michael R. “A NATION CHALLENGED: MILITARY STRATEGY; Gains and Limits in 





———. “Giving Up Those Weapons: After Libya, Who Is Next?” The New York Times, January 1, 
2004, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/01/world/giving-up-those-weapons-
after-libya-who-is-next.html. 
Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. “Consolidated 
Federal Laws of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act,” 
December 12, 2013. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-27.5/FullText.html. 
Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canad. “Canadian Sanctions 
Related to Libya,” February 28, 2011. http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-
pays/libya-libye.aspx?lang=eng. 
———. “Canadian Sanctions Related to Syria,” May 24, 2011. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-pays/syria-syrie.aspx?lang=eng. 
———. “International Organizations and Forums,” November 26, 2009. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/organisations.aspx?lang=eng. 
———. “International Security and Disarmament,” June 30, 2010. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/security-securite2.aspx?lang=eng. 
Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada. “Canadian Sanctions 
Related to Iran,” January 31, 2011. http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-
pays/iran.aspx?lang=eng. 
———. “Canadian Sanctions Related to Iran.” GAC, January 31, 2011. 
http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-pays/iran.aspx?lang=eng. 
Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada. “Canada-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Strategic Dialogue.” GAC. Accessed August 21, 2017. http://www.international.gc.ca/name-
anmo/gcc-canada-ccg.aspx?lang=eng. 
Government of Canada, Immigration. “People of Syrian Ethnic Origin in Canada,” October 23, 
2015. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/research/syrians.asp. 
Government of Canada, Legislative Services Branch. “Consolidated Federal Laws of Canada, 
National Defence Act,” June 1, 2015. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/. 
———. “Consolidated Federal Laws of Canada, Special Economic Measures Act,” July 1, 2003. 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-14.5/index.html. 
Government of Canada, National Defence. “Canada First Defence Strategy.” Government of 
Canada, May 12, 2008. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page. 
Government of Canada, National Defence. “National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces | 





Government of Canada, National Defence. “Operation IMPACT | Middle East | Canadian Armed 
Forces,” August 19, 2014. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-
impact.page. 
———. “Operation MOBILE,” July 22, 2013. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-
past/op-mobile.page. 
———. “Operation UNIFIER,” July 31, 2015. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/op-
unifier.page. 
Government of Canada, Prime Minister of Canada. “Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic 
Development Mandate Letter,” November 12, 2015. http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-innovation-
science-and-economic-development-mandate-letter. 
———. “Minister of International Trade Mandate Letter,” November 12, 2015. 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-international-trade-mandate-letter. 
Government of Canada, Public Safety. “About the Listing Process: Terrorist Entities,” December 
16, 2015. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-
en.aspx. 
Government of Canada, Statistics Canada. “Police Officers, by Province and Territory (Police 
Officers per 100, 000 Population),” March 29, 2017. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-
tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/legal05c-eng.htm. 
Grabinsky, Jonathan, and John J. Mearshimer,. Israel and the Two-State Solution: Fantasy or 
Reality? Journal: Chicago Policy Review, August 15, 2013. 
http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2013/08/15/israel-and-the-two-state-solution-fantasy-or-
reality/. 
Granatstein, J. L. “NORAD.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed August 21, 2017. 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/norad-north-american-air-defence-
agreement/. 
GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA, and ALASTAIR SMITH. “Honest Threats: The Interaction of 
Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
46, no. 2 (April 1, 2002): 175–200. doi:10.1177/0022002702046002001. 
Hansen, David G. “The Immutable Importance of Geography.” Parameters, Spring 1997, 55–64. 
“Harper Joins Global Call for Resignation of Syrian Leader Assad.” The Toronto Star, August 18, 
2011, sec. Canada. 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/08/18/harper_joins_global_call_for_resignation_
of_syrian_leader_assad.html. 
“Harper Outlines Key Parts Of His Economic Action Plan.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
https://www.conservative.ca/harper-outlines-key-parts-of-his-economic-action-plan-2/. 
HARTLE, ANTHONY E. “Atrocities in War: Dirty Hands and Noncombatants.” Social Research 
69, no. 4 (2002): 963–79. doi:10.2307/40971587. 
107 
 
Harvard Divinity School, Religious Literacy Project. “The Ba’ath Party in Syria.” Harvard 
Divinity School. Accessed August 15, 2017. https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/baath-party-syria. 
Hehir, Aidan. “The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the 
Responsibility to Protect.” International Security 38, no. 1 (July 1, 2013): 137–59. 
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00125. 
Heinze, Eric A. “Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: Norms, Discourse, and State 
Practice.” Parameters 36, no. 1 (2006): 20–34. 
HENDREN, JOHN. “Afghanistan Yields Lessons for Pentagon’s Next Targets.” Los Angeles 
Times, January 21, 2002. http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/21/news/mn-24009. 
Hermann, Margaret G. “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of 
Political Leaders.” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 7–46. 
doi:10.2307/2600126. 
Herring, Eric, and Glen Rangwala. “Iraq, Imperialism and Global Governance.” Third World 
Quarterly 26, no. 4–5 (June 1, 2005): 667–83. doi:10.1080/01436590500127909. 
Heydarian, Richard Javad. How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and 
Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings. New ed. edition. London: Zed Books, 2014. 
Hildebrandt, Timothy, Courtney Hillebrecht, Peter M. Holm, and Jon Pevehouse. “The Domestic 
Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology.” Foreign 
Policy Analysis 9, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 243–66. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00189.x. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond. “Syrian Foreign Policy under Bashar Al-Asad.” Ortadoğu Etütleri 1, no. 1 
(July 2009): 7–26. 
Hochman, Dafna. “Rehabilitating a Rogue: Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for US Policy.” 
Parameters 36, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 63–78. 
Holmes, John W. “Middle Power.” The Canadian Encyclopedia. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power/. 
HOLSTI, OLE R. “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy.” Journal of International 
Affairs 21, no. 1 (1967): 16–39. doi:10.2307/24381351. 
Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and 
Political Dilemmas. 1 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Hopf, Ted. “Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identities 
and Military Intervention in Abkhazia.” Review of International Studies 31, no. S1 (December 
2005): 225–43. doi:10.1017/S026021050500687X. 
Hornick, Charles, Daniel Burkhart, and David Shunk. “Adapting to Strategic Change: Rightsizing 
the Army in Austere Times.” Parameters 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2016): 41–50. 




Huffington Post Canada. “Stephen Harper: Canadian Forces Punched Above Their Weight In 
Libya.” Huffington Post Canada, September 1, 2011. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/09/01/stephen-harper-canadian-forces-
libya_n_944489.html. 
Hughes, Michael. “Libyan Regime Change: U.S./NATO Hypocrisy Knows No Bounds.” 
Huffington Post, April 19, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-hughes/libya-us-
nato-_b_850418.html. 
———. “Mobilizing for Humanitarian Intervention: African Americans, Diasporic Lobbying, and 
Lessons from Haiti, Rwanda, and Sudan.” International Journal 65, no. 4 (December 1, 
2010): 1037–53. doi:10.1177/002070201006500403. 
———. “Mobilizing for Humanitarian Intervention: African Americans, Diasporic Lobbying, and 
Lessons from Haiti, Rwanda, and Sudan Coming Attractions.” International Journal 65 (2010 
2009): 1037–54. 
Huliaras, Asteris. “Qadhafi’s Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.” African 
Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): 5–25. doi:10.2307/3518370. 
Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2011: Syria,” January 24, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2011/country-chapters/syria. 
———. “World Report 2011: Tunisia,” January 24, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2011/country-chapters/tunisia. 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth. “World Report 2012: Syria,” January 22, 
2012. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/syria. 
Ibbitson, John. “Commons Unanimously Backs Canada’s Deployment to Libya,” March 21, 2011, 
sec. news. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/commons-unanimously-backs-
canadas-deployment-to-libya/article573406/. 
———. “How Harper Transformed Canada’s Foreign Policy,” January 31, 2014, sec. column. 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/how-harper-transformed-canadas-foreign-
policy/article16626348/. 
“Implementation of Resolution 2231 (2015).” Accessed August 17, 2017. 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). “The Responsibility to 
Protect.” International Development Research Centre, 2001. 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
“International Independent Investigation Commission | United Nations Security Council 
Subsidiary Organs.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1636/investigation-commission. 




“Iran a Threat Not Just to Israel, Says Germany’s Merkel.” Reuters, February 25, 2014. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-germany-idUSBREA1O0O820140225. 
“Iran Could Have Nuclear Bomb by 2015: Germany.” Reuters, January 18, 2007. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iran-germany-idUKL242351720061024. 
“Iran Hits Back after West Condemns Its Human Rights Record.” Reuters, October 31, 2014. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-un-rights-idUSKBN0IK11R20141031. 
“Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details.” BBC News, January 16, 2016, sec. Middle East. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655. 
“Iran Sanctions.” US Department of State. Accessed August 19, 2017. 
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm. 
“IS Conflict: France Launches Air Strikes in Syria.” BBC News, September 27, 2015, sec. Middle 
East. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34372892. 
Ishibashi, Natsuyo. “The Dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to Iraq: Public Opinion, 
Elections, and Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey 47, no. 5 (October 1, 2007): 766–89. 
doi:10.1525/as.2007.47.5.766. 
“Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) | Militant Organization.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
Accessed August 18, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-
Levant. 
“Italy and Silvio Berlusconi Face Libya Dilemma.” BBC News, March 1, 2011, sec. Europe. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12612405. 
Jackson, Peter. “French Military Intelligence Responds to the German Remilitarisation of the 
Rhineland, 1936 - A Look at French Intelligence Machinery in 1936.” Intelligence and 
National Security 22, no. 4 (August 1, 2007): 546–62. doi:10.1080/02684520701640514. 
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Benjamin I. Page. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” The American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107–23. doi:10.2307/30038922. 
Jacoby, Tami Amanda. “Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: Canadian Democracy and the 
Campaign against Global Terrorism.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 11, no. 3 (January 1, 
2004): 65–79. doi:10.1080/11926422.2004.9673378. 
James, Gregory K., Larry Holcomb, and Chad T. Manske. “Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn.” 
Joint Task Force 64, no. 1 (2012): 24–29. 
Jeffrey, Brooke. Dismantling Canada: Stephen Harper’s New Conservative Agenda. Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015. 
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–
214. doi:10.2307/2009958. 
———. “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.” International 
Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 42–63. doi:10.2307/2539347. 
———. System Effects. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
110 
 
Jhaveri, Nayna J. “Petroimperialism: US Oil Interests and the Iraq War.” Antipode 36, no. 1 
(January 1, 2004): 2–11. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2004.00378.x. 
“Jim Karygiannis, ‘Request for Emergency Debate’ on March 10th, 2011 | Openparliament.ca.” 
Accessed July 6, 2017. https://openparliament.ca/debates/2011/3/10/jim-karygiannis-1/. 
“Jim Maloway, ‘Human Rights Situation in Iran’ on Feb. 16th, 2011 | Openparliament.ca.” 
Accessed July 6, 2017. https://openparliament.ca/debates/2011/2/16/jim-maloway-8/. 
“John Baird, ‘Foreign Affairs’ on June 16th, 2011 | Openparliament.ca.” Accessed July 21, 2017. 
https://openparliament.ca/debates/2011/6/16/john-baird-6/. 
Juneau, Thomas. “The Civil War in Syria and Canada’s Containment Policy.” International 
Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 70, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 471–88. 
doi:10.1177/0020702015584581. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” 
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–91. doi:10.2307/1914185. 
Kelly, Michael. “The Air-Power Revolution.” Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 4 (April 2002). 
Kessler, Thomas Erdbrink and Glenn. “Obama Message to Iran,” Washington Post, March 21, 
2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032000398.html.  
Khosrokhavar, Farhad. New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World. 1 edition. Boulder, CO: 
Routledge, 2012. 
Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. “The Dividends of Diversion: Mature Democracies’ 
Proclivity to Use Diversionary Force and the Rewards They Reap from It.” British Journal of 
Political Science 39, no. 3 (2009): 483–515. doi:10.2307/27742755. 
Kitchen, Veronica, and Karthika Sasikumar. “Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada 
Relations and Counter-Terrorism Policy.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (January 
5, 2009): 155–73. doi:10.1080/09546550802587572. 
Kramer, Helmut, and Helfried Bauer. “Imperialism, Intervention Capacity, and Foreign Policy 
Making: On the Political Economy of the US Intervention in Indochina.” Journal of Peace 
Research 9, no. 4 (December 1, 1972): 285–302. doi:10.1177/002234337200900401. 
Labs, Eric J. “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims.” Security 
Studies 6, no. 4 (June 1, 1997): 1–49. doi:10.1080/09636419708429321. 
Lacher, Wolfram. “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution.” Middle East Policy 18, 
no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 140–54. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00516.x. 
Landis, Joshua. “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 




Landler, Mark, and Michael R. Gordon. “Obama Says U.S. Will Recognize Syrian Rebels.” The 
New York Times, December 11, 2012, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/us/obama-says-us-will-recognize-syrian-rebels.html. 
Layne, Christopher. “The ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon.” 
Security Studies 12, no. 2 (December 1, 2002): 120–64. doi:10.1080/09636410212120011. 
“Lebanon’s Siniora Asks U.N. to Set up Hariri Court.” Reuters, May 14, 2007. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-tribunal-idUSL1420555620070514. 
“Les CF-18 partent pour la Méditerranée.” Journal de Montréal, March 19, 2011. 
http://lejournaldemontreal.canoe.ca/actualites/national/archives/2011/03/20110318-
100858.html. 
Lesch, David W. Syria: The Rise and Fall of the House of Assad. New Haven, Conn: Yale 
University Press, 2012. 
Leverett, Flynt. Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. First Edition edition. Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 
Levitt, Matthew. “Syria’s Financial Support for Jihad.” Middle East Quarterly, January 1, 2010. 
http://www.meforum.org/2579/syria-financial-support-jihad. 
Levy, Jack S. “Domestic Politics and War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 
1988): 653–73. 
Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. Causes of War. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. ; Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 
“Libya — Exploration & Production — Suncor.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
http://www.suncor.com/about-us/exploration-and-production/libya. 
“Libya: Anti-Gaddafi Protesters ‘under Fire’ in Tripoli.” BBC News, February 25, 2011, sec. 
Africa. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12576427. 
“Libya: NTC’s Jalil Vows State Based on ‘Moderate Islam.’” BBC News, September 13, 2011, sec. 
Africa. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14894264. 
“Libya: UK Apache Helicopters Used in Nato Attacks.” BBC News, June 4, 2011, sec. UK. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-13651736. 
Libyan NTC Leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil: “On the Threshold of a New Era,” 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14613659. 
Linzer, Dafna. “Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb,” August 2, 2005. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080101453.html. 
Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2013. 
MacAskill, Ewen, and Julian Borger. “Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says 




Macklem, Patrick. “Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International 
Law.” Ethics &amp; International Affairs 22, no. 4 (January 2008): 369–93. 
doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2008.00172.x. 
Maclean’s. “NATO Formally Joins Coalition against ISIS - Macleans.ca.” Macleans, May 25, 
2017. http://www.macleans.ca/news/nato-formally-joins-coalition-against-isis/. 
Maher, Stephen. “The Capitalist State, Corporate Political Mobilization, and the Origins of 
Neoliberalism.” Critical Sociology 43, no. 4–5 (July 1, 2017): 779–97. 
doi:10.1177/0896920516652457. 
Mansour, Imad. “Iran and Instability in the Middle East: How Preferences Influence the Regional 
Order Over the Transom.” International Journal 63 (2008 2007): 941–66. 
Manulak, Michael W. “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign 
Policy?” International Journal 64, no. 2 (2009): 565–81. doi:10.2307/40204525. 
“Mark Eyking, ‘Libya’ on June 14th, 2011 | Openparliament.ca.” Accessed July 22, 2017. 
https://openparliament.ca/debates/2011/6/14/mark-eyking-1/?page=1. 
Marshall, Shana. “Syria and the Financial Crisis: Prospects for Reform?” Middle East Policy 16, 
no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 106–15. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2009.00394.x. 
Martin, Patrick. “The Fall of the Damascus Spring,” July 16, 2010, sec. news. 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/the-fall-of-the-damascus-
spring/article1212439/. 
Mayer, Arno J. “Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956: A Research 
Assignment.” The Journal of Modern History 41, no. 3 (1969): 292–303. 
McAndrew, Mike. “Pan Am Flight 103’s Victims: A List of Those Killed 25 Years Ago.” 
Syracuse.com, December 21, 2013. 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/12/pan_am_flight_103s_victims_a_list_of_tho
se_killed_25_years_ago.html. 
McDermott, Rose. Risk-Taking in International Politics. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 2011. 
McDermott, Rose, and Jacek Kugler. “Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theory Analyses: 
The US Decision to Launch Operation ‘desert Storm’, January 1991.” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 24, no. 3 (September 1, 2001): 49–85. doi:10.1080/01402390108437845. 
Mcmenamin, Iain. “If Money Talks, What Does It Say?: Varieties of Capitalism and Business 
Financing of Parties.” World Politics 64, no. 1 (January 7, 2012): 1–38. 
McPeak, Merrill A., and Robert A. Pape. “Hit or Miss.” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2004. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2004-09-01/hit-or-miss. 
Mearsheimer, John J. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” International 
Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56. doi:10.2307/2538981. 
113 
 
———. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 
(Winter  /1995 1994): 5–49. 
———. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated ed. edition. New York: WW Norton, 2014. 
Menon, Rajan. “Beijing and Moscow Balk at ‘Interference.’” Current History, November 2012. 
http://www.currenthistory.com/pdf_org_files/111_748_310.pdf. 
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. “Statement by 99 Syrian Intellectuals (27 September 2000),” 
September 27, 2000. https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0010_sdoc0927.htm. 
Middle East Watch (Organization). Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the 
Asad Regime. Yale University Press, 1991. 
Mohns, Erik, and André Bank. “Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?” Middle East 
Policy 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 25–35. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00545.x. 
Moniz, Dave. “Afghanistan’s Lessons Shaping New Military.” USA Today, October 8, 2002. 
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-10-07-afghan-lessons_x.htm. 
Morris, Justin. “Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum.” International 
Affairs 89, no. 5 (September 1, 2013): 1265–83. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12071. 
Morse, Edward L. “Low and Behold- Making the Most of Cheap Oil  Essay.” Foreign Affairs 88 
(2009): 36–52. 
Mund, Brian Zachary. “In Defense of Sovereignty: An Analysis of Russian Voting Behavior in the 
United Nations Security Council (1995-2012).” University of Pennsylvania: College 
Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, April 1, 2013. 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1188&context=curej. 
Murray, Robert W. “Humanitarianism, Responsibility or Rationality? Evaluating Intervention as 
State Strategy.” In Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention, 15–33. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013. doi:10.1057/9781137273956_2. 
———. “Middlepowermanship and Canadian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century.” Seton Hall 
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14 (2013): 89–100. 
Musu, Costanza. “Canada and the MENA Region: The Foreign Policy of a Middle Power.” 
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 65–75. 
doi:10.1080/11926422.2012.674379. 
Nation Master. “Canada vs United States: Military Facts and Stats.” Accessed June 1, 2017. 
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/compare/Canada/United-States/Military. 
“National Board of Directors - Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters.” Accessed August 21, 2017. 
http://www.cme-mec.ca/english/who-we-are/national-board-of-directors.html. 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN (NCRI). “Our Resistance.” Accessed 
August 2, 2017. http://ncr-iran.org/en/about/our-resistance. 




NATO. “Member Countries.” Accessed March 20, 2017. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm. 
———. “NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed 
August 10, 2017. http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. 
———. “NATO and Libya (Archived).” Accessed August 13, 2017. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm. 
———. “Press Briefing on Libya by NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu, Joined by NATO 
Military Committee Chairman Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola and Commander of Operation 
Unified Protector , Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard (Complete Transcript).” Accessed 
August 15, 2017. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_71897.htm. 
“NATO Chief: Intervention Just Won’t Work in Syria.” Foreign Policy. Accessed August 19, 
2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/29/nato-chief-intervention-just-wont-work-in-syria/. 
“NATO Rules out Syria Intervention - Al Jazeera English.” Al Jazeera, October 31, 2011. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/201111103948699103.html. 
Nesi, Giuseppe. “RECOGNITION OF THE LIBYAN NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL: 
WHEN, HOW AND WHY.” Research Gate, January 2011. doi:10.1163/22116133-
90000209. 
Neville, Peter. “A Prophet Scorned? Ralph Wigram, the Foreign Office and the German Threat, 
1933-36.” Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 41–54. 
doi:10.1177/0022009405049265. 
News, and Canada. “Canada Engaging Syrian Opposition Movement.” National Post, November 
18, 2011. http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-engaging-syrian-opposition-
movement/wcm/43934113-e24a-43b5-b134-edb01e5b0c24. 
———. “Iran Is the ‘world’s Most Serious Threat to International Peace’: Stephen Harper.” 
National Post, January 6, 2012. http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/iran-is-the-worlds-most-
serious-threat-to-international-peace-stephen-harper/wcm/13d75316-8b6f-4157-905c-
4cc6aab7a93c. 
News, and Economy. “U.S. Slaps More Duties on Canadian Lumber Shipments.” Financial Post, 
June 26, 2017. http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/u-s-slaps-more-duties-on-
canadian-lumber-shipments. 
Niakooee, Seyed Amir. “Contemporary Arab Uprisings: Different Processes and Outcomes.” 
Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, no. 3 (September 2013): 421–45. 
doi:10.1017/S1468109913000170. 
Nincic, Miroslav. “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention.” Political 
Research Quarterly 50, no. 1 (1997): 97–120. doi:10.2307/449030. 
———. The Logic of Positive Engagement. Cornell University Press, 2011. 
“No UN Mandate for Libyan Ground Operations, Regime Change – Lavrov.” RT International. 
Accessed August 19, 2017. https://www.rt.com/politics/nato-russia-berlin-lavrov-rogozin/. 
115 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO and Afghanistan.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm. 
Nossal, Kim Richard, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin. The Politics of Canadian Foreign 
Policy, Fourth Edition. McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015. 
Noyes, James H. “Does Washington Really Support Israel?” Foreign Policy, no. 106 (1997): 144–
60. doi:10.2307/1149179. 
Obama White House. “President Obama: ‘We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL,’” 
September 10, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-
obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil. 
Observatory of Economic Complexity. “Syria (SYR) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.” 
Accessed August 17, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/syr/. 
OEC MIT. “OEC - Canada (CAN) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.” Accessed August 2, 
2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/can/#Destinations. 
———. “Products That Canada Exports to the United States (2015).” Accessed May 28, 2017. 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/can/usa/show/2015/. 
Ogilvie-White, Tanya. “International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Issue of Non-Compliance.” European Journal of International Law 18, no. 
3 (June 1, 2007): 453–76. doi:10.1093/ejil/chm027. 
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. 
“OPEC : Our Mission.” Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Accessed August 16, 
2017. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm. 
Open Canada. “Charles Bouchard on the Canadian Forces, NATO, and What We Learned in 
Libya.” OpenCanada, June 6, 2012. https://www.opencanada.org/features/charles-bouchard-
on-the-canadian-forces-nato-and-what-we-learned-in-libya/. 
Orend, Brian. “Just Wars and Cosmopolitan Hope.” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political 
Theory, no. 104 (2004): 128–49. 
Orlov, Vladimir A., and Alexander Vinnikov. “The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian 
Nuclear Issue.” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 7, 2005): 49–66. 
Ottaway, Marina, and Bethany Lacina. “International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from 
the 1990s.” SAIS Review 23, no. 2 (August 13, 2003): 71–92. doi:10.1353/sais.2003.0051. 
Pack, Jason, and MyiLibrary Ltd. The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-
Qadhafi Future. MyiLibrary. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
http://lib.myilibrary.com?id=503020. 




Pargeter, Alison. Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 
2012. 
Pei, Minxin. “Opinion | Why Beijing Votes With Moscow.” The New York Times, February 7, 
2012, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/why-beijing-votes-with-
moscow.html. 
Polk, William R. “Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad.” The Atlantic, 
December 10, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-
syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/. 
Pollack, Kenneth, and Ray Takeyh. “Taking on Tehran.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 20–34. 
doi:10.2307/20034273. 
Portela, Clara. “The EU Sanctions Operation in Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means.” 
UNISCI Discussion Papers. Singapore: Singapore Management University: Research Unit on 
International Security and Cooperation, October 2012. 
https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/viewFile/40717/39037. 
Press, Associated. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Trump Administration Approves Agreement but Review 
Looms.” The Guardian, April 19, 2017, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/19/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-administration-
approves-agreement-but-review-looms. 
Press, Canadian. “Accept Reforms or Go, Canada Tells Syria’s Assad,” June 21, 2011, sec. news. 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/accept-reforms-or-go-canada-tells-syrias-
assad/article583901/. 
“Profile: Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali.” BBC News, June 20, 2011, sec. Africa. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12196679. 
“Q&A: Iran Nuclear Issue.” BBC News, October 7, 2010, sec. Middle East. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11494946. 
“Qaddafi Scoffs at Demands for Bombing Suspects.” The New York Times, November 29, 1991. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/29/world/qaddafi-scoffs-at-demands-for-bombing-
suspects.html. 
Radio-Canada. “L’engagement du Canada.” Radio-Canada.ca, October 31, 2008. http://radio-
canada.ca/nouvelle/371817/aghanistan-mission. 
Rahman-Jones, Imran. “Why Does Russia Support Syria and President Assad?” BBC Newsbeat, 
April 11, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/39554171/why-does-russia-support-
syria-and-president-assad. 
Recchia, Stefano. “Authorising Humanitarian Intervention: A Five-Point Defence of Existing 




———. “Why Seek International Organisation Approval under Unipolarity? Averting Issue 
Linkage vs. Appeasing Congress.” International Relations 30, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 78–101. 
doi:10.1177/0047117815593137. 
“Recognition of Libyan Rebels by UK ‘Stains Britain’, Says Gaddafi.” Evening Standard, July 28, 
2011. http://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/recognition-of-libyan-rebels-by-uk-stains-
britain-says-gaddafi-regime-6426751.html. 
Reinold, Theresa. “The Responsibility to Protect – Much Ado about Nothing?” Review of 
International Studies 36, no. S1 (October 2010): 55–78. doi:10.1017/S0260210510000446. 
“Resolution 1970 (2011).” United Nations Security Council, February 26, 2011. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011). 
“Resolution 1973 (2011).” United Nations Security Council, March 17, 2011. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011). 
“Revisiting ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after Libya and Syria.” E-International Relations. Accessed 
July 29, 2017. http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/08/revisiting-responsibility-to-protect-after-libya-
and-syria/. 
Rheault, Ludovic. “Corporate Lobbying and Immigration Policies in Canada.” Canadian Journal 
of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 46, no. 3 (September 2013): 691–
722. doi:10.1017/S0008423913000644. 
Rieff, David. “Saints Go Marching In.” The National Interest, no. 114 (2011): 6–15. 
doi:10.2307/42896386. 
Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. “The Preventive War That Never Happened: Britain, 
France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s.” Security Studies 16, no. 1 (March 2007): 32–
67. 
Rivera, Joseph De. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. 1St Edition edition. 
Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill, 1965. 
Roberts, Adams. “The Law and the Use of Force after Iraq.” Survival 45, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 31–
56. doi:10.1080/00396338.2003.100716061. 
Robinson, Bill. “Canadian Military Spending 2010-2011.” Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, Foreign Policy Series, March 2011, 1–10. 
Rogin, Josh. “Syria’s Assad Must Go? Obama No Longer Seems Sure.” Chicago Tribune. 
Accessed August 19, 2017. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-
barack-obama-syria-bashar-assad-20151207-story.html. 
Rozman, Gilbert. “Russian Repositioning in Northeast Asia: Putin’s Impact and Current 
Prospects.” In Russia’s Prospects in Asia, edited by Stephen J. Blank, 63–89. Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2010. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1032.pdf. 





Rudderham, M.A. “Canada and United Nations Peace Operations: Challenges, Opportunities, and 
Canada’s Response Over the Transom.” International Journal 63 (2008 2007): 359–84. 
Rudner, Martin. “Challenge and Response: Canada’s Intelligence Community and the War on 
Terrorism.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 11, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 17–39. 
doi:10.1080/11926422.2004.9673364. 
“Russia Accuses Nato of ‘Expanding’ UN Libya Resolution.” The Independent, July 5, 2011. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/russia-accuses-nato-of-expanding-un-libya-
resolution-2306996.html. 
“Russia Writes off $9.8 Billion of Syrian Debt.” The Daily Star. January 26, 2005. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb//News/Middle-East/2005/Jan-26/71201-russia-writes-off-98-
billion-of-syrian-debt.ashx. 
Saleh, Compiled by Ian. “Saudi Arabia ‘Day of Rage’ Begins Quietly, Markets Watch Protests 
Closely,” March 11, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031103685.html. 
Scarborough, Rowan. “Pentagon Uses Afghan War as Model for Iraq.” Washington Times, 
December 4, 2001. 
Schweller, Randall L. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107. doi:10.2307/2539149. 
Sciboz, Joëlle. “Security Council - Quick Links: Vetoes.” Research starter. Accessed August 16, 
2017. http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto. 
Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, New Edition. 
Reprint edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 
“Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria That Would Have Threatened 
Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation.” United Nations: Meetings 
Coverage and Press Releases, July 19, 2012. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10714.doc.htm. 
“Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2042 (2012), Authorizing Advance Team to 
Monitor Ceasefire in Syria.” United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 
Accessed August 16, 2017. http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10609.doc.htm. 
Shore, Zach. “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 5–18. doi:10.1177/002200949903400101. 
Simon, S., and D. Benjamin. “America and the New Terrorism.” Survival 42, no. 1 (January 1, 
2000): 59–75. doi:10.1093/survival/42.1.59. 
Singh, Anita. “The Diaspora Networks of Ethnic Lobbying in Canada.” Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 340–57. doi:10.1080/11926422.2012.737342. 
Sirin, Cigdem V. “Examining the Effects of Political Information and Intervention Stages on 
Public Support for Military Interventions: A Panel Experiment.” Acta Politica 46, no. 3 (July 
1, 2011): 261–93. doi:10.1057/ap.2010.18. 
119 
 
Skelton, Eric. “China, the Tiananmen Massacre: Emotional Crowd of 30,000 Marches on 
Consulate.” The Globe and Mail, June 5, 1989. 
Smith, Alastair. “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems.” International Studies 
Quarterly 40 (1996): 133–53. 
Special Economic Measures Act, Pub. L. No. S.C. 1992, c. 17 (1992). http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-14.5/page-1.html#h-1. 
“Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - SFOR - Homepage.” Accessed August 18, 2017. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/. 
staff, Foreign. “Like Dictator, like Son: How the Assads Maintain a Tight Grip on Power.” The 
Guardian, March 14, 2012, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/14/dictator-son-assad-grip-power. 
“State Sponsors of Terrorism.” US Department of State. Accessed August 18, 2017. 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. 
“Stéphane Dion, ‘Libya’ on June 14th, 2011 | Openparliament.ca.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
https://openparliament.ca/debates/2011/6/14/stephane-dion-1/. 
Stephen, Matthew. “The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing No 
Longer Overlooked: Assessing the Existence and Role of Middle Power States.” Seton Hall 
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14 (2013): 36–52. 
Struck, Doug. “Canada Fights Myth It Was 9/11 Conduit.” Washington Post, April 9, 2005. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38816-2005Apr8.html. 
“Suncor’s Operations in Libya - Brief Backgrounder.” Suncor Response. Accessed August 18, 
2017. http://response.suncor.com/2011/03/suncors-operations-in-libya-brief-
backgrounder.html. 
Sutton, Alex. “Towards an Open Marxist Theory of Imperialism.” Capital & Class 37, no. 2 (June 
1, 2013): 217–37. doi:10.1177/0309816813483485. 
“Syria Air Strikes Conducted by UK Military Pilots.” BBC News, July 17, 2015, sec. UK. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33562420. 
“Syria Conflict: German MPs Vote for Anti-IS Military Mission.” BBC News, December 4, 2015, 
sec. Europe. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35002733. 
“Syrian Troops Leave Lebanon After 29-Year Occupation.” The New York Times, April 26, 2005, 
sec. Middle East. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/26/international/middleeast/syrian-
troops-leave-lebanon-after-29year-occupation.html. 
Taber, Campbell Clark Jane. “Opposition Presses Harper over Prorogation, Demands Syria 





Tait, Carrie. “Suncor, PetroCan Merger Will Forge Oil Giant.” Financial Post, March 23, 2009. 
http://www.financialpost.com/Suncor+PetroCan+merger+will+forge+giant/1416981/story.ht
ml. 
Takeyh, Ray. “Qadhafi’s Libya and the Prospect of Islamic Succession.” Middle East Policy 7, no. 
2 (February 1, 2000): 154–64. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2000.tb00157.x. 
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power 
Intervention in the Periphery.” Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (2004): 177–211. 
doi:10.2307/3792561. 
———. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.” International Security 
25, no. 3 (January 1, 2001): 128–61. doi:10.1162/016228800560543. 
Talmon, Stefan. “Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People.” 
Chinese Journal of International Law 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 219–53. 
doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmt014. 
Terrill, W. Andrew. “Iran’s Strategy for Saving Asad.” The Middle East Journal 69, no. 2 (April 
25, 2015): 222–36. 
“The 10 Lobby Groups with the Most Contact with Federal Officials - Macleans.ca.” Macleans, 
November 27, 2012. http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/in-the-lobby/. 
“The Big Lie About the Libyan War.” Foreign Policy. Accessed August 19, 2017. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/. 
The Canadian Press. “Suncor Back to Work in Libya.” The Canadian Press, January 31, 2012. 
http://www.castanet.net/news/Canada/70425/Suncor-back-to-work-in-Libya. 
The Data Team. “The Arab Spring, Five Years On.” The Economist, January 11, 2016. 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-8. 
The Egmont Group. “About - The Egmont Group.” Accessed August 6, 2017. 
https://www.egmontgroup.org/en/content/about. 
The Embassy of the United States of America (Ottawa, Canada). “U.S. – Canada Economic 
Relations.” The Embassy of the United States of America (Ottawa, Canada), n.d. Canada. 
USEmbassy.gov. 
The Interim National Council. “A Vision of a Democratic Libya,” March 29, 2011. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Documents/2011/3/29/2011329113923943811The%20Inte
rim%20Transitional%20National%20Council%20Statement.pdf. 
“The Libyan Rorschach.” Foreign Policy. Accessed April 6, 2017. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/12/the-libyan-rorschach/. 
The Observatory of Economic Compleity. “What Does Libya Import From Canada?” MIT. 
Accessed October 25, 2016. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/. 




The Star. “Canada’s NATO Contribution Goes beyond Spending, Trudeau Says after Meeting with 
Merkel | Toronto Star.” Toronto Star, February 17, 2017. 
https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/02/17/trudeau-merkel-differ-on-trumps-nato-
warning-as-two-meet-in-berlin.html. 
“The Syrian National Council.” Carnegie Middle East Center. Accessed April 9, 2017. 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en. 
“The Syrian Strike: What Will It Do to Canada’s Economy? - Erica Alini.” Canadian Business - 
Your Source For Business News, August 30, 2013. http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogs-
and-comment/syria/. 
Times, The New York. “Officers Fire on Crowd as Syrian Protests Grow.” The New York Times, 
March 20, 2011, sec. Middle East. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/middleeast/21syria.html. 
Tir, Jaroslav. “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict.” The 
Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 413–25. doi:10.1017/s0022381609990879. 
Tir, Jaroslav, and Michael Jasinski. “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting 
Ethnic Minorities.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 5 (October 1, 2008): 641–64. 
doi:10.1177/0022002708318565. 
Tocqueville, Alexis De. Democracy in America. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 
2006. 
Tomz, Michael R., and Jessica L. P. Weeks. “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace.” 
American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849–65. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055413000488. 
Totten, Michael J. “The Woman Who Blew Up the Arab World.” World Affairs Journal, May 17, 
2012. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/woman-who-blew-arab-
world. 
Trading Economics. “Canada Exports | 1971-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News.” 
Accessed May 28, 2017. tradingeconomics.com/canada/exports. 
Transparency International. “Transparency International - Libya.” Accessed August 9, 2017. 
https://www.transparency.org/country/LBY. 
 “Trudeau Finally Signs CETA Free Trade Deal with European Union, but Admits Work Is ‘just 




“Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes from and What It Means.” Foreign Policy. Accessed 




TVA Nouvelles. “Harper Confirme L’envoi de Sept CF-18.” TVA Nouvelles, March 18, 2011. 
http://www.tvanouvelles.ca/2011/03/18/harper-confirme-lenvoi-de-sept-cf-18. 
Tyler, Patrick E. “Libyan Stagnation a Big Factor in Qaddafi Surprise.” The New York Times, 
January 8, 2004, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/08/world/libyan-stagnation-a-
big-factor-in-qaddafi-surprise.html. 
“UNAMID Facts and Figures - African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.” 
Accessed August 17, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml. 
“Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
and Security Issues, 2016. 
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201608_op_understanding_irans_role_in_the_syrian_conflic
t_0.pdf. 
United Nations. “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All 
Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions | 
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” March 17, 2011. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. 
United Nations Development Programme. “Libya | Human Development Reports,” 2016. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBY. 
United Nations Security Council. “Meeting Record: S/PV.6627,” October 4, 2011. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627. 
———. “Meeting Record: S/PV.6711,” February 4, 2012. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6711. 
“UNSC Draft Resolution S/2011/612.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/612. 
“UNSC Draft Resolution S/2012/77.” Accessed August 16, 2017. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/77. 
“UNSC Draft Resolution S/2012/538,” n.d. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%20538.pdf. 
“U.S. Announces New Iran-Related Sanctions.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed August 19, 
2017. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272635.htm. 
U.S. Department of State. “Syria Sanctions.” Accessed August 15, 2017. 
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/syria/. 
“U.S. Recognizes Libyan Rebels’ Authority.” Accessed April 9, 2017. 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/15/libya.us.recognition/index.html. 
Valenta, Jiri, and Leni Friedman Valenta. “Why Putin Wants Syria.” Middle East Quarterly, 
March 1, 2016. http://www.meforum.org/5876/why-putin-wants-syria. 
123 
 
Valter, Stéphane. “The Syrian War: Religious & Political Representations.” Syria Studies 6, no. 3 
(December 1, 2014): 1–36. 
Vandewalle, Dirk. A History of Modern Libya. 2nd edition. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
———. QADHAFIS LIBYA, 1969-1994. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995. 
Walling, Carrie Booth. “Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and Humanitarian Intervention.” 
Human Rights Quarterly 37, no. 2 (May 13, 2015): 383–413. doi:10.1353/hrq.2015.0034. 
Wastnidge, Edward. “Iran and Syria: An Enduring Axis.” Middle East Policy 24, no. 2 (June 1, 
2017): 148–59. doi:10.1111/mepo.12275. 
Weaver, Matthew, and Haroon Siddique. “Syria: ‘Bomb Attacks’ in Damascus - Friday 23 
December.” The Guardian, December 23, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-
east-live/2011/dec/23/syria-egypt-yemen-protests-live-updates. 
Weisenthal, Joe. “The Top 20 Oil Producing Countries In The World.” Business Insider, March 6, 
2012. http://www.businessinsider.com/the-top-20-oil-producing-countries-in-the-world-2012-
3. 
Wells, Anne Sharp. Historical Dictionary of World War II. 1St Edition edition. Lanham, Md: 
Scarecrow Press, 1999. 
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. 1 edition. Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Werrell, Caitlin E., Francesco Femia, and Troy Sternberg. “Did We See It Coming?: State 
Fragility, Climate Vulnerability, and the Uprisings in Syria and Egypt.” SAIS Review of 
International Affairs 35, no. 1 (May 27, 2015): 29–46. doi:10.1353/sais.2015.0002. 
“What Is NATO?” What Is NATO? Accessed August 21, 2017. http://www.nato.int/nato-
welcome/index.html. 
“What Is TPP? Understanding the New Pacific Trade Deal.” The Globe and Mail. Accessed 
August 21, 2017. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-
business/what-is-tpp-understanding-the-new-pacific-tradedeal/article26648948/. 
“Why Putin Is So Committed to Keeping Assad in Power.” Foreign Policy. Accessed August 19, 
2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/putins-russia-is-wedded-to-bashar-al-assad-syria-
moscow/. 
Widmaier, Wesley W., and Luke Glanville. “The Benefits of Norm Ambiguity: Constructing the 
Responsibility to Protect across Rwanda, Iraq and Libya.” Contemporary Politics 21, no. 4 
(October 2, 2015): 367–83. doi:10.1080/13569775.2015.1014178. 
Woolley, Peter J. “Geography and the Limits of US Military Intervention.” Conflict Quarterly, Fall 
1991, 35–50. 
World Federalists (Canada). “Canada & UN Peacekeeping.” World Federalist Movement - 
Canada, July 2014. http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/EN-PKO4.pdf. 
124 
 
“World Report 2011: Iran.” Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2011/country-chapters/iran. 
Yoo, John C. “Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention Symposium: UN Reform.” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 6 (2006 2005): 641–62. 
Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. “Navigating Troubled Waters: Canada in the Arab World.” In Elusive 
Pursuits: Lessons From Canada’s Interventions Abroad, 35–58. Waterloo, ON: Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, 2015. 
Zakaria, Fareed. “Face the Facts: Bombing Works.” Newsweek, December 3, 2001. 
———. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Zyla, Benjamin. “NATO and Post-Cold War Burden-Sharing NATO at 60.” International Journal 
64 (2009 2008): 337–60. 
 
